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OASIS OR MIRAGE: THE SUPREME COURT’S THIRST FOR
DICTIONARIES IN THE REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS ERAS
JAMES J. BRUDNEY*  AND LAWRENCE BAUM**
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries, virtually non-existent
before 1987, has dramatically increased during the Rehnquist and
Roberts Court eras to the point where as many as one-third of
statutory decisions invoke dictionary definitions. The increase is
linked to the rise of textualism and its intense focus on ordinary
meaning. This Article explores the Court’s new dictionary culture in
depth from empirical and doctrinal perspectives. We find that while
textualist justices are heavy dictionary users, purposivist justices
invoke dictionary definitions with comparable frequency. Further,
dictionary use overall is strikingly ad hoc and subjective. We
demonstrate how the Court’s patterns of dictionary usage reflect a
casual form of opportunistic conduct: the justices almost always
invoke one or at most two dictionaries, they have varied individual
brand preferences from which they often depart, they seem to use
general and legal dictionaries interchangeably, and they lack a
coherent position on citing to editions from the time of statutory
enactment versus the time the instant case was filed.
The Article then presents an innovative functional analysis of how
the justices use dictionaries: as way stations when dictionary
meanings are indeterminate or otherwise unhelpful; as ornaments
when definitions are helpful but of marginal weight compared with
more traditional resources like the canons, precedent, legislative
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history, or agency deference; and as barriers that preclude inquiry
into or reliance on other contextual resources, especially legislative
history and agency guidance. Ornamental opinions (the largest
category) typically locate dictionary analysis at the start of the
Court’s reasoning, subtly conveying that the lexicographic method
should matter more than other interpretive resources. Barrier
opinions would have been inconceivable prior to 1987 but now occur
with disturbing frequency: they elevate the justices’ reliance on
definitions in a radically acontextual manner, ignoring interpretive
evidence from the enactment process and from agency experience.
Finally, the Article analyzes whether the Court’s patterns of
inconsistent dictionary usage, and its tendency to cherry-pick
definitions that support results reached on other grounds, distin-
guish dictionaries from high-profile interpretive resources such as
canons and legislative history that have been criticized on a similar
basis. We contend that dictionaries are different from a normative
vantage point, essentially because of how both wings of the Court
have promoted them by featuring definitions frequently and
prominently in opinions, and also how dictionaries are effectively
celebrated as an independently constituted source of objective
meaning (unlike the canons as judicial branch creations and
legislative history as a congressional product). Yet our findings
demonstrate that the image of dictionary usage as authoritative is a
mirage. This contrast between the exalted status ascribed to dictio-
nary definitions and the highly subjective way the Court uses them
in practice reflects insufficient attention to the inherent limitations
of dictionaries, limitations that have been identified by other scholars
and by some appellate judges. The Article concludes by offering a
three-step plan for the Court to develop a healthier approach to its
dictionary habit.
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“The writing of a dictionary ... is not a task of setting up authorita-
tive statements about the ‘true meaning’ of words, but a task of
recording, to the best of one’s ability, what various words have
meant to authors in the distant or immediate past. The writer of a
dictionary is a historian, not a lawgiver.” 1
“[T]he acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular
meaning is whether you could use the word in that sense at a
cocktail party without having people look at you funny.” 2
INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has substan-
tially increased its use of dictionaries when construing statutory
text.3 Legal scholars link this remarkable proliferation to the rise of
textualism and its intense focus on ordinary meaning. Many
Justices invoke dictionary definitions as an objective and relatively
1. S.I. Hayakawa, How Dictionaries Are Made (1939), in THE SEAGULL READER: ESSAYS
129,130-31 (Joseph Kelly ed., 2d ed. 2008).
2.  Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra
note 6 (providing extended discussion of the Johnson case); infra text accompanying notes
220-228.
3. See infra Part I.A. See generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling
the Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-
First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77 (2010) [hereinafter Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the
Lexicon Fortress] (discussing the high rate of the Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries within
decisions since 1999); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become
a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 231
(1999) [hereinafter Thumma & Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress] (discussing
the increase in dictionary usage within the Supreme Court decisions in final decades of the
twentieth century).
This development has attracted some attention beyond the legal academy. See, e.g.,  Dennis
Baron, The Highest Dictionary in the Land?, OUPBLOG (Oxford University Press)  (June 23,
2013, 6:30 AM), http://blog.oup.com/2013/06/scotus-marriage-definition-dictionary/ (discussing
the Court’s frequent use of dictionaries in the context of the definition of marriage); Robert
Barnes, Dictionary: A Way to Define an Argument, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2013, at A13
(discussing a preliminary version of our article).
Analyses of dictionary use by the Supreme Court, including our own, focus on traditional
dictionaries. The justices have not yet made use of the online Urban Dictionary (available at
www.urbandictionary.com), a collection of slang terms, but many lower-court opinions have
cited the Urban Dictionary. See Leslie Kaufman, For the Word on the Street, Courts Call Up
an Online Witness, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2013, at A1 (discussing the Urban Dictionary and its
use in court opinions). See also infra note 73 (examining illustrative court uses as well as
particular concerns about reliance on Urban Dictionary by courts).
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authoritative resource for discerning that ordinary meaning.4 On
the other hand, a chorus of critics has contended that, through their
unrestrained use of dictionaries, textualist Justices are advancing
a subjective and at times result-oriented approach to statutory
interpretation.5 There has been virtually no discourse among the
Justices themselves regarding possible risks or benefits associated
with dictionary reliance, even as that reliance continues to grow.6
Such prolonged silence stands in marked contrast to the Court’s
internal debates regarding altered judicial attitudes toward the
value of legislative history.7
4. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 278 (1998); Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First:
Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 401, 402 (2003); Lawrence M. Solan, Finding Ordinary Meaning in the
Dictionary, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE 255, 269 (Marlyn
Robinson ed., 2003); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1437, 1440 (1994); Phillip A. Rubin, Note, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use
Dictionaries in Accordance With Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167, 168 (2010); Jason
Weinstein, Note, Against Dictionaries: Using Analogical Reasoning to Achieve a More
Restrained Textualism, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 649, 650 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 4, at 315-21, 325-30 (criticizing Justice Scalia’s dictionary
use in four cases); Rubin, supra note 4, at 200-04 (criticizing Justice Scalia’s dictionary use
in a separate case); Hoffman, supra note 4, at 419-28 (criticizing the Court’s dictionary
reliance in three decisions in the 1990s); Solan, supra note 4, at 267-74 (same); see also
Richard A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, but the Letter Giveth Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13,
2012, at 18 (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) and criticizing Justice Scalia’s reliance on
dictionaries as part of his “textual originalism”).
6. But cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 72, 415-19 (2012) (discussing the role of dictionaries in assisting a court to
discern ordinary meaning). A rare instance in which two Justices debated the implications of
dictionary usage was Johnson v. United States. See 529 U.S. 694, 706-07 n.9. In Justice
Scalia’s dissent, he criticized the majority’s choice of dictionary definition as “fictitious” and
added that the meaning assigned failed the “acid test” of “whether you could use the word in
that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.” Id. at 718-19 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see supra note 2 and accompanying text. Justice Souter for the majority
responded that “relying on an uncommon sense of a word” was fully justified “when the
ordinary meaning fails to fit the text” and would frustrate “the realization of clear
congressional policy,” adding that “[w]hen text implies that a word is used in a secondary
sense, JUSTICE SCALIA’s cocktail-party textualism ... must yield to the Congress of the United
States.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 707 n.9. We discuss Johnson in more detail in Part IV.B. 
7. See, e.g., Bank One Chi. N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-78, 279-
80 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring, debating with Scalia, J. concurring); Wis. Pub. Intervenor
v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4, 616-23 (1991) (White, J., majority, debating with Scalia,
J., concurring). See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance
on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
488 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:483
This Article aims to develop a deeper understanding of the
Court’s expanding appetite for dictionaries in the Rehnquist and
Roberts eras. We explore different aspects of the Justices’ dictionary
use through an empirical examination of nearly 150 majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions from 1986 to 2011. Our dataset
focuses on three statutory areas—criminal law, labor and employ-
ment law, and business and commercial law—in which the Justices
have invoked a range of general, legal, and technical dictionaries.8
Our findings are predictable in certain respects but surprising in
many others.
Consistent with previous scholarship, we identify a major
increase in usage over time that is evident for all three subject
areas. Within the Rehnquist and Roberts eras, the most intriguing
rise dates not from Justice Scalia’s arrival in 1986 but from the
arrival of Justices Souter, Thomas, and Breyer by the early and
mid-1990s. In contrast with the sharp decline in legislative history
use that followed right after Justice Scalia joined the Court,9
dictionary usage in majority opinions doubled for all three subjects
between the early Rehnquist terms (1986-91) and the remainder of
the Rehnquist era. Usage has continued to rise since 2005, although
not at quite the same steep rate.
We found that dictionary usage is more prevalent in criminal law
cases than in the two civil law categories. Additionally, with respect
to criminal law cases, the Justices use general dictionaries more
often than in civil cases, and when referencing a dictionary they
define more words per case in the criminal law area. We believe
multiple factors may help explain these criminal law findings,
including the higher stakes associated with a statutory violation
and the related due process concerns of the Justices. 
In the vast majority of instances across our dataset, the Justices
use only one or two dictionaries to define a particular statutory
term. Having reviewed a sample of briefs from one-seventh of the
cases referencing dictionaries, we found that opinions for the Court
L. 117, 161-62 (2008) (discussing ongoing and, at times, heated disagreement between Justice
Scalia and other Justices concerning the utility of legislative history).
8. See infra Parts I.A, III (explaining our approach to coding for these three subject
areas).
9. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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are highly selective about dictionary use in relation to what the
litigants propose. Majority opinions generally use fewer dictionaries
and define fewer words than have been offered by the parties or the
federal government as amicus; in addition, majority opinions often
make use of dictionaries and define words not mentioned in the
parties’ briefs. This selectivity, combined with the low number of
dictionaries typically used to define a word, suggests that the
Justices use dictionaries primarily to buttress positions they have
already reached rather than to try and establish the true or truly
applicable meaning of a contested word.
During our twenty-five year period, the heaviest dictionary users
in our dataset include Justices Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Souter, and
Alito. The dictionary profiles for these Justices are individualized
and distinctive. Justice Scalia opts more heavily for Webster’s
Second New International and the American Heritage Dictionary,
general dictionaries that have been characterized as prescriptive in
the lexicographic literature. Justice Thomas relies disproportion-
ately on Black’s Law Dictionary. Justice Alito is partial to Webster’s
Third New International and the Random House Dictionary, both
regarded as descriptive. Justices Breyer and Souter are more
eclectic: each is a frequent user of Black’s, but Breyer also invokes
Webster’s Third and the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) with
some regularity while Souter turns more often to Webster’s Second.
Indeed, even the Justices who make disproportionate use of one or
two dictionaries are eclectic in that they frequently cite other
dictionaries in particular cases. This pattern is consistent with a
practice of seeking out definitions that fit a Justice’s conception of
what a word should mean rather than using dictionaries to deter-
mine that meaning.
At the same time, we found little apparent relationship between
dictionary use and ideology in our dataset. Majority opinions by
conservative Justices were not significantly more or less likely to
cite dictionaries than majority opinions by liberal Justices. Addition-
ally, dictionary use neither amplified nor constrained the ideological
tendencies of liberal and conservative Justices with respect to
outcomes. In contrast to previous findings involving the Court’s
490 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:483
reliance on canons and legislative history,10 the absence of any
significant ideological relationships suggests that the Justices’
dictionary use reflects a less purposive and more casual form of
opportunistic conduct.
One further issue that has occasioned discussion among legal
scholars is whether to rely on dictionaries from around the date of
statutory enactment in an effort to reveal what might have been
Congress’s original intent or purpose in using the word, or from
around the date the lawsuit was filed in order to reflect the
understanding of readers who must comply with the statutory
language today. Despite the possibility of a principled preference
between these two time periods, the Court’s practice—by subject
and by individual Justice—suggests no coherent position on the
issue.
Given our rich array of findings, we have some thoughts on their
implications. The substantial growth in Supreme Court dictionary
usage seems most likely to stem from the Justices’ concep-
tion—subconscious or otherwise—that dictionaries are a valuable
asset because they can be promoted to key audiences as objective
and neutral proxies for ordinary meaning. The sharp increase
occurred during a period when the Court’s statutory decisions were
being overridden with unusual frequency and the Justices were
persistently criticized for ideological decisionmaking and a lack of
judicial restraint. The asserted link between dictionaries and the
discovery of ordinary meaning may well reflect the Court’s search
for an oasis from which to deflect or rebut charges of judicial
activism. The perspective on dictionaries as authoritative, “law-like”
interpretive resources is most closely associated with textualists
such as Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, but it also seems
attributable to purposivists such as Justices Breyer, Souter, and
Stevens. 
A number of our findings, however, undermine the justification
for dictionary use as promoting objectivity and principled analysis.
The Court’s tendency to rely on one or at most two dictionaries per
case, the wide variation in dictionary brand preferences among the
Justices, the fact that even Justices with “preferred” dictionaries are
10. See infra Part III.A.3 at notes 146, 149 (discussing findings from prior studies by
Brudney).
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far from consistent in usage across individual cases, and the absence
of a coherent approach to the time period distinction between
statutory enactment and lawsuit filing, combine to suggest that this
comparatively novel interpretive resource is being applied in
strikingly subjective ways.
One might ask whether the Court’s pattern of inconsistent
dictionary usage, or its tendency to cherry-pick definitions that
support results reached on other grounds, distinguishes dictionaries
from high-profile interpretive resources such as canons or legislative
history that have been criticized on a similar basis.11 Our response
to this question is that dictionaries are different from a normative
vantage point because of how the Justices have, in effect, promoted
them by frequently and prominently featuring dictionary definitions
in their opinions. There has been an astonishing rise in dictionary
usage by the Justices: from 3.3 percent of all decisions in the last
five years of the Burger Court to 33.7 percent of our dataset
decisions during the 2008-2010 Roberts Court Terms.12 Unlike
canons and legislative history, dictionaries have been invoked to a
similar extent by liberal and conservative wings of the Court.
Moreover, when the Justices cite dictionaries to help interpret
statutory language, they typically do so as a first step before turning
to other interpretive resources.
By using dictionary definitions in this way, the Justices have
given them a special interpretive status, one that is derived from
their proximity to the statutory text itself. Implicitly, the Justices
have endorsed dictionary definitions for their non-ideological and
objective veneer. In contrast with canons and legislative history,
dictionaries are attractive to the Justices as an independently
constituted source of meaning rather than an asset created by—and
susceptible to manipulation from—the judicial or legislative
branches. This attractiveness is reinforced by the Justices’ seem-
11. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 376-78 (criticizing legislative history as
prone to manipulation); Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of
Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 579, 590 (1992) (criticizing
canons on similar grounds).
12. See discussion of the 3.3 percent figure infra note 28, and discussion of the 33.7
percent figure infra Part III.A.1. The three subject-matter areas from our dataset on which
the 33.7 percent figure is based cover a sufficiently broad range of decisions in both criminal
and civil law fields to render the comparison a reasonable one.
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ingly unreflective acceptance of dictionaries despite the cautions
that scholars and some judges have repeatedly raised about their
validity as a resource.
Yet, as our findings demonstrate, the image of dictionary usage
as heuristic and authoritative is little more than a mirage. The
Justices do not consult dictionaries to discover previously unknown
word meanings but rather to choose a “correct” word meaning from
various options. Although this process has involved considerable
judicial discretion, dictionary definitions, as invoked by the Court,
can confer a deceptive sense of objectivity and legitimacy even when
they are a minor or peripheral contributor to the result. Such an
effect becomes particularly troubling when dictionaries are given
elevated status, effectively preempting analysis of a statute as a
purposive communication drafted and negotiated among legislators
and further shaped by implementing agencies. 
In an effort to make sense of the Court’s opaque and subjective
approach, we consider the Court’s dictionary usage decisions as
performing certain distinct functions. One is limited and field-
specific: in the criminal law area, the Justices’ dictionary-linked
ordinary meaning approach fulfills a notice function for individuals
faced with the possibility of severe penal sanctions.13 The other
three functions associated with dictionary use apply to all three
areas that we examined. First, there are way station opinions, in
which a Justice consults relevant dictionary meanings, recognizes
that they are indeterminate or otherwise unhelpful, and concludes
that the search for statutory meaning requires reliance on different
contextual factors.14 Second, there are ornamental role opinions, in
which a Justice invokes dictionary meanings as support but in fact
other resources—canons, precedent, legislative history and purpose,
policy consequences, agency deference—carry far more weight in the
Court’s reasoning.15 Dictionaries contribute only marginal substan-
tive value, but also add a certain authoritative gloss to the opinion’s
interpretive fabric. Finally, there are barrier opinions, in which a
Justice invokes the dictionary in conjunction with related “ordinary
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
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meaning” arguments as effectively dispositive.16 This approach
enables the Court to preclude inquiry into or reliance on other
contextual resources, especially resources derived from Congress,
such as legislative history or purpose, and the Executive, in the
form of deference to agency guidance.
We examine a cross section of Court cases to illustrate our broad
functional categories. The way station opinions are refreshingly
candid about the limited role dictionaries can and should play. The
ornamental role opinions are easily the most numerous, and they
tend to be authored by liberal Justices. These opinions elevate the
dictionary’s status by featuring it as integral to statutory analysis
even though other resources are ultimately more important. The
consequent legitimization of dictionary usage helps give rise to the
barrier opinions, authored primarily—if not exclusively—by
conservative Justices. This third category highlights certain
disturbing effects of dictionary usage.
Based on our empirical examination and doctrinal analysis, we
conclude that dictionaries add at most modest value to the interpre-
tive enterprise, and that they are being overused and often abused
by the Court.17 In consulting a very small number of dictionaries
when searching for “ordinary meaning,” and in failing to announce
and follow consistent practices or presumptions as to dictionary
brands and their appropriate historical periods, the Justices have
acted in a highly subjective manner. Indeed, they appear to behave
as participants at a cocktail party in a different sense from the party
envisioned by Justice Scalia in our opening quotation: they give
selective attention to whatever definition suits their interests or
value preferences while filtering out other definitional noise.18 
16. See infra Part IV.D.
17. See infra Part IV.E.
18. See generally Adelbert W. Bronkhorst, The Cocktail Party Phenomenon: A Review of
Speech Intelligibility in Multiple-Talker Conditions, 86 ACTA ACUSTA UNITED WITH ACUSTICA
117, 117 (2000), available at http://ele.aut.ac.ir/~ahadi/Courses/Robust%20SP/References/
Bronkhorst%20Cocktail_party%20Acta_acustica_2000.pdf (discussing studies “dealing with
the intelligibility of speech presented against a background of competing speech[,]” i.e., the
cocktail party effect); E. Colin Cherry, Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, with
One and with Two Ears, 25 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y AM. 975, 975 (1953), available at
http://www.ee.columbia.edu/~dpwe/papers/Cherry53-cpe.pdf (publishing the first major
scholarship on the cocktail party effect). 
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This subjectivity is especially troubling precisely because the
Justices appear to view dictionaries as an unusually objective source
of textual meaning. The contrast between the status ascribed to
dictionaries and the way they are used in practice reflects insuffi-
cient attention to the inherent limitations of dictionaries and to the
need to apply them with care when interpreting statutes. Further,
the Justices’ subjective dictionary culture may mislead lawyers
faced with the responsibility to construct arguments for the Justices
to review.
Relatedly and importantly, the thirst for dictionaries has too often
encouraged the Court to minimize or ignore the legislative and
regulatory contexts in which defined words are meant to be used.
Any resolution of contested meaning should take thoughtful account
of how a word is best understood as part of a purposive statutory
communication. That in turn requires devoting more attention to
what the enacting Congress and the implementing agency intended
and focusing less on what a lexicographer’s collection of prior or
preferred uses suggests.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the Court’s substan-
tial increase in dictionary usage and considers possible explanations
for why the Court has embraced this relatively novel interpretive
asset. Part II examines leading conceptual criticisms of the Court’s
newfound appetite for dictionaries, bringing together observations
from appellate judges as well as legal scholars. Part III presents our
empirical findings, including the methods we used to assemble our
dataset. Part IV pursues aspects of these findings in doctrinal terms
by analyzing illustrative decisions, and also explores implications
of our results in a larger context.
I. THE COURT’S EMBRACE OF DICTIONARIES
A. Striking Expansion in Usage
Notwithstanding the availability of dictionaries since the dawn of
the Republic, regular dictionary use in Supreme Court opinions is
a very recent development. Jeffrey Kirchmeier and Samuel
Thumma have assembled a dataset on dictionary usage by the
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Justices.19 Relying on their compilations, we calculate that from
1800 to 1969 the Court used dictionaries to define terms in a total
of 145 opinions.20 During the Burger Court years, from 1969 to 1986,
the Justices used dictionaries in eighty-nine opinions—an increase
from prior eras but still an average of only about five opinions per
Term.21 
Starting in the Rehnquist years, however, the Court experienced
dramatic growth in dictionary usage. The Kirchmeier and Thumma
data indicate that the Justices invoked dictionary definitions in 373
opinions during this nineteen-year period.22 That is a 400 percent
increase from the Burger era, even though the Rehnquist Court
issued some 30 percent fewer total opinions than its predecessor.23
Dictionary usage has continued to increase in the Roberts Court:
during its first five Terms (through June 2010), the Justices relied
on dictionaries to define a word or phrase in 138 opinions.24 Taking
the longer view, dictionary usage in the twenty-five years of the
Rehnquist and early Roberts eras (October 1986 to June 2011) more
than doubled the Court’s total usage in the previous 186 years.
Our dataset, comprising nearly 700 cases decided since October
1986, reflects a steady and substantial increase in dictionary usage
through the Rehnquist era and the Roberts years to June 2011. We
19. See Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress, supra note 3, apps. A, B, C
at 133-261; Thumma & Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress, supra note 3, apps.
A, B, C at 303-562.
20. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress, supra note 3, at 248-
52 & n.179. We simply added the figures the authors presented for each decade through the
1960s, after determining that none of the sixteen opinions listed for the 1960s arose in the
Burger era.
21. See id. at 252-53 & n.181. Of the ninety-six opinions listed for the 1980s, we
determined that forty-nine arose in the Burger years and forty-seven in the Rehnquist Court.
22. In addition to the forty-seven opinions from the 1980s, see id., there were 239 opinions
in the 1990s and eighty-seven in the final five Terms of the Rehnquist Court, October 2000
to June 2005. By reviewing the listings in Appendix B, opinions using dictionaries, classified
by Justice and in reverse chronological order, we determined the breakdown for 2000 to 2005.
See Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress, supra note 3, at 85, app. B at 180-
221.
23. The Burger Court issued 2807 opinions for the Court and 6013 total opinions. The
Rehnquist Court issued 2040 majority opinions and 4230 total opinions. See SUPREME COURT
DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (results on file with
authors). 
24. See Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress, supra note 3, app. B at 180-
221 (relying on Appendix B classifications).
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reviewed Supreme Court cases with published opinions in three
different subject-matter areas. We examined 362 cases in labor and
employment law, 218 cases involving criminal law statutes, and 115
cases related to business and commercial law.25 Because Justices
Souter, Thomas, and Breyer—among the more frequent dictionary
users—had not all joined the Court until well into the Rehnquist
era, we hypothesized that the largest increase in dictionary use
might have come after the first six Rehnquist Terms. Figure 1 below
illustrates how the Court’s use of dictionaries in majority opinions
has risen since the 1986 term. For each of our three subject areas,
the proportionate use of dictionaries in majority opinions effectively
doubled between the first six Terms of the Rehnquist Court and the
ensuing thirteen Terms.
Figure 1. Proportion of Majority Opinions Using 
Dictionary
25. The labor and employment cases are those that directly address some aspect of the
employment relationship under federal law. The criminal law cases are those that
substantially implicate statutes listed under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The business and
commercial cases are those that substantially implicate statutes appearing in Title 15 of the
U.S. Code. For further explanation on and more detail about our search techniques, see infra
notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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Intriguingly, this pattern of increased dictionary usage over time
suggests that Justice Scalia may not have been the same primary
influence as he was in shaping the Court’s declining appetite for
legislative history. During his first five Terms on the Court, Justice
Scalia authored more than a dozen opinions attacking the use of
legislative history as an interpretive asset26 and an even larger
number of opinions invoking dictionary definitions as a positive
interpretive resource.27 The Court’s overall reliance on legislative
history experienced its most precipitous decline in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, whereas our data indicate that the Court’s thirst
for dictionaries is more closely identified with the period after
1992.28 
B. Shelter from the Storm
A major factor in the post-1992 increase for our dataset is the
impact of newly appointed Justices Souter (1990), Thomas (1991),
and Breyer (1994). Each of these Justices authored close to the same
number of dictionary-using majority opinions as Justice Scalia,
although they all served for a shorter time period.29 That Justices
26. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 7, at 161 & n.164 (listing twelve concurring or
dissenting opinions by Scalia attacking legislative history from 1987 to 1989). For additional
separate opinions by Scalia attacking legislative history in 1990 and 1991, see, for example,
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Sullivan v. Finklestein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); and Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 603 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). See generally Joan Biskupic, Scalia Sees No Justice in Trying to Judge Intent of
Congress on a Law, WASH. POST, May 11, 1993, at A4 (discussing Scalia’s refusal to use
committee reports to glean Congressional intent).
27. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress, supra note 3, at 252
nn.180-81 (identifying fourteen separate Scalia opinions using dictionaries in 1986 to 1991
Terms in addition to eleven Scalia-authored majorities during same period).
28. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35 (2005) (showing that Court’s reliance on
legislative history fell from 42.1 percent in 1984-88 to 22.6 percent in 1989-93 and remained
between 22 and 25 percent for the next decade). A Westlaw search for dictionaries in majority
and plurality opinions during the Burger Court shows that 28 of 846 cases (3.3 percent) used
a dictionary from 1981-86, 19 of 802 (2.4 percent) from 1976-80, and 12 of 1159 (1 percent)
from 1969-75. The 3.3 percent figure for 1981-86 rose to 8.0 percent of our dataset in 1986-91
and then 17.9 percent of our dataset for 1992-2004. See infra Part III.A.1.
29. Scalia served for all twenty-five Terms of our study. Souter served for twenty-one,
Thomas for twenty, and Breyer for seventeen. See also Members of the Supreme Court of the
United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
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who are far from avowed textualists—such as Justices Souter,
Breyer, Stevens, and O’Connor—were relatively heavy dictionary
users from the 1990s onward30 suggests that there may be broader
behavioral influences at work. 
One possibility we considered is that the Justices are responding
to the growing volume and length of federal statutes over recent
decades. Perhaps generalist federal judges have come to believe that
they lack sufficient subject-matter expertise to cope with Congress’s
complex and, at times, opaque directives. They fall back on dictio-
naries and related textual maneuvering in order to avoid error or
embarrassment in the face of information overload.31
We find this hypothesis interesting but less than wholly persua-
sive for several reasons. First, the number of public laws passed per
Congress has diminished steadily in the past six decades and, in
recent years, is less than three-fifths of what it was in the early
1950s.32 The average length of enacted laws has substantially
increased since 1951, but that steady increase began in the 1960s,33
whereas the sharp rise in dictionary usage dates from the 1990s.
Admittedly, the increasing length of the U.S. Code—criticized in the
members.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
30. See infra Part III.A.
31. This hypothesis was advanced by a federal judge and a legal scholar at a Yale Law
School symposium. See Hon. Pierre N. Leval, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
and Thomas W. Merrill, Columbia Law School, Framing the Judicial Debate, Panel at
Interpreting Federal Statutes: The Dysfunctional Dialogue Between the Courts and Congress
Symposium (Mar. 28, 2012) (notes on file with Brudney, a participant on the panel).
32. Compare, e.g., 68 Stat. xxx (1995) (indicating that Congress enacted 781 public laws
in the 83rd Congress (1953-54)), with 122 Stat. xviii (2010) (indicating that Congress enacted
460 public laws in 110th Congress (2009-10)).
33. Between 1951 and 1964, the pages per public law for each Congress ranged from 1.80
(84th Congress, 1955-56) to 3.00 (88th Congress, 1963-64). To calculate the pages per public
law, we divided the total number of pages by the number of public laws enacted during the
two sessions of a particular Congress. See, e.g., 75 Stat. 3-833 (1961) and 76 Stat. 3-1249
(1962) (enacting 885 public laws within 2076 pages and yielding 2.35 pages per public law for
87th Congress); 69 Stat. 3-726 (1955) and 70 Stat. 3-1126 (1956) (yielding 1.80 pages per
public law in 84th Congress); 65 Stat. 3-769 (1951) and 66 Stat. 3-820 (1952) (yielding 2.66
pages per public law in 82nd Congress). The page averages rose to 3.59 in the 89th Congress
(from 1965-66), to 7.01 by the 94th Congress (from 1975-76), to 9.38 by the 99th Congress
(from 1985-86) and to 15.81 by the 104th Congress (from 1995-96). See, e.g., 119 Stat. 3-3619
(2005) and 120 Stat. 3-3702 (2006) (yielding 15.18 pages per public law for 109th Congress);
99 Stat. 3-1924 (1985) and 100 Stat. 3-4309 (1986) (yielding 9.38 pages per public law for 89th
Congress); 79 Stat. 3-1313 (1965) and 80 Stat. 3-1603 (1966) (yielding 3.59 pages per public
law for 79th Congress).
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1970s as “hyperlexis”34—may have resulted in federal judges
becoming less familiar with individual statutes. But the very recent
jump in dictionary use by federal appellate courts extends to heavily
litigated older laws, not just newer lengthy statutes.35 Moreover, the
heaviest dictionary use in our dataset was associated with criminal
statutes. Although it is difficult to generalize across entire subject
areas, these criminal laws appear to be shorter and to involve less
complex terminology than their civil counterparts in employment
discrimination, pension protection, securities regulation, or con-
sumer law.36
A more likely explanation may well stem from growing criticism
of the courts as activist and ideological. During the late 1970s and
1980s, Congress overrode Supreme Court decisions substantially
more often than it had in the prior period.37 These overrides were
especially frequent in the ideologically charged areas of civil rights
and criminal law.38 When Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act
overrode eleven Supreme Court decisions issued between 1985 and
34. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767-70
(1977). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberate
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 623-29 (2006) (identifying increased
length of amendments to 1963 Clean Air Act–in 1970, 1977, and 1990–and describing
amendments as primarily codifying, modifying, or rejecting various administrative
regulations). But see Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much” Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585,
1601-32 (2012) (discussing conceptual weaknesses in techniques for measuring hyperlexis and
in proposals for remedying it).
35. We searched the U.S. Court of Appeals Westlaw database for majority or plurality
opinions through April 2012 that cited to one of two older federal statutes and that also used
a dictionary. Our Westlaw search found that, while only 6.0 percent of 779 circuit court
majority opinions citing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 used the term
“dictionary,” that percentage rises to 12.8 percent when considering the subset of 227 circuit
court majorities from 2002-12. Notes on file with authors. Similarly, while 12.3 percent of the
374 total majorities citing the Copyright Act of 1976 used the term “dictionary,” the number
increases to 20.8 percent for the subset of 101 majorities from 2002-12. Notes on file with
authors.
36. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2006) (codifying various definitions used throughout the enacted law); Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681x (2006); Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006).
37. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (reporting increase from six Supreme Court overrides
per congressional session from 1967-74 to twelve overrides per session from 1975-90).
38. See id. at 344-45; see also infra note 39 (listing eleven additional civil rights decisions
overridden in 1991).
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1990,39 national media coverage reflected the widespread perception
that the Rehnquist Court in the late 1980s had become dangerously
activist on matters of statutory civil rights.40
Faced with a barrage of attacks on its neutrality and willingness
to exercise restraint, the Court may have sought greater protection
from such charges going forward. As Professor Lawrence Solan has
observed, the shift in focus from “intended meaning” to “ordinary
meaning” reflects a heightened concern to avoid being perceived as
exercising judicial discretion and thereby “imposing [judicial]
values on the people ... [and] reducing ... [the Court’s] legitimacy.”41
Other scholars have observed that by citing dictionaries as “linguis-
tic authority” for their language-based conclusions, the justices
subtly analogize these dictionaries to the judicial precedent that
serves as “legal authority” in their reasoning.42 Reliance on dictio-
nary definitions thus helps to confer an “aura of objectivity,
precision, and certainty”43 on the Court’s legal conclusions. 
Ironically, almost a century earlier the Court faced charges that
it was imposing its own ideological values by insisting upon “the
theoretical objectivity of the plain meaning rule” and excluding
consideration of legislative history.44 In a parallel response over a
39. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T
Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989);
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Library of Congress v. Shaw,
478 U.S. 310 (1986); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
See generally Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and
Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT THEATER 224, 224-31 (Weisberg & Patterson
eds., 1998).
40. See, e.g., Casting a Shadow Over Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 1988, at A26;
Linda Greenhouse, Job Ruling Makes It Clear: Court Has Shifted Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1989, at A21; Judy Mann, Judicial Activism at Work, WASH. POST, June 9, 1989, at B3; Never
Too Late for White Men, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1989, at A26. See generally THOMAS M. KECK,
THE MOST ACTIVIST COURT IN HISTORY 165, 195 (2004). 
41. Solan, supra note 4, at 278.
42. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 412; James J. Weis, Comment, Jurisprudence by
Webster’s: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 MERCER L. REV. 961, 963 (1988).
43. Aprill, supra note 4, at 314.
44. Harry Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation
of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 24-25 (1939); see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (stating that when language of statute has a plain meaning, “the duty
of interpretation does not arise,” and “the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according
to its terms”); id. at 496-500 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the importance of
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period of several decades, conservative and liberal Justices increas-
ingly came to rely on legislative history to insulate the Court from
such attacks.45
Based on evidence of a downturn in congressional overrides since
the 1990s,46 one might infer that perceptions of the Court’s objectiv-
ity and judicial restraint have improved in its new dictionary-
consuming era. In a recent article, however, Professor Richard
Hasen concludes that the decline is due not to renewed congressio-
nal or public respect but rather to deep political polarization within
Congress that has seriously diminished override capacity.47
Meanwhile, the Court has become more partisan in its alignment
and also less favorably regarded by the public.48 
The Court’s embrace of dictionaries is, in our view, highly
relevant to this volatile political climate. Some Justices may
sincerely believe dictionaries to be objective and neutral interpretive
resources whereas others may view them primarily as a tool to
advance preferred outcomes. Perhaps the Justices act sincerely in
some cases and more strategically in others. Before examining the
results from our dataset, we consider certain criticisms leveled at
“putting ourselves in the place of the legislators” even when the words have a clear meaning,
and relying on legislative history as persuasive evidence in that case). See generally Roscoe
Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 379-81 (1907).
45. See James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 891
(1929) (“When the intent or meaning of the legislature is discoverable, statutory
interpretation posits no serious problem except the political one of insistence on judicial
humility.”); see, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 542-49 (1940) (Reed,
J.); Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1928) (Holmes, J.); Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474-78 (1921) (Pitney, J.) superseded by statute,
29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (West 2013). See generally Jones, supra note 44, at 4-8, 23-26; Nicholas
Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and
the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (documenting
major increase in legislative history use by Court from 1940-45).
46. Richard Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and
Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013) (reporting that overrides declined to 2.8 per Term
from 2001-12).
47. See id. at 233-42.
48. Since the appointments of Justice Alito to succeed Justice O’Connor and Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan to succeed Justices Souter and Stevens, all conservative justices were
selected by Republican presidents and all liberal justices by Democratic presidents. For
evidence of the Court’s loss of public support, see Adam Liptak, Approval Rating for Justices
Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1; The Pew Research Center,
Supreme Court Favorability Reaches New Low (2012), available at http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/5-1-12%20Supreme%20Court%20Release.pdf.
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the Court’s dictionary practices. These concerns, expressed by
appellate judges as well as legal scholars, reflect a series of reserva-
tions that have gone essentially unanswered.
II. CONCEPTUAL CRITICISMS OF DICTIONARY USAGE
A. The Court’s Reluctance to Value Larger Context
The main users of dictionaries are not judges but students and
adult learners, academics, and devotees of crossword puzzles and
other word games.49 Survey evidence indicates that the principal
reasons people consult dictionaries are to establish the existence of
a word, to check on a word’s derivation or spelling, and to discover
the meaning of a word unfamiliar or confusing to the user.50 By
contrast, judges almost never consult dictionaries to explore
unfamiliar words; rather, they do so to select the “correct” or
“appropriate” meaning from among definitional options.
This judicial mission is in tension with lexicographers’ expressed
reservations about the very term “definition.” Lexicographers
observe that it is more realistic to speak of their role as explaining
the various ways a word has been used in the recent and distant
past, rather than implying that a word’s meaning can be “defini-
tively” and precisely pinned down.51 As emphasized by Professor
(and later U.S. Senator) S.I. Hayakawa, a dictionary’s function is to
record prior uses of a word, not to make authoritative statements
about the word’s true meaning.52
In this connection, Judge Richard Posner recently expressed an
overarching concern associated with dictionary usage by courts:
“Dictionary definitions are acontextual, whereas the meaning of
sentences depends critically on context, including all sorts of
background understandings.”53 Two other respected appellate court
judges have voiced similar skepticism about judicial reliance on
49. See HOWARD JACKSON, LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 23 (2002). See generally B.T.
SUE ATKINS & MICHAEL RUNDELL, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY 28-29
(2008).
50. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 49, at 29; JACKSON, supra note 49, at 23, 76.
51. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 49, at 407.
52. See Hayakawa, supra note 1, at 130-31.
53. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012).
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word definitions. They referred to dictionaries as “museum[s] of
words ... rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures”54
and as “word zoos” where “one can observe ... [a word’s] features ...
but one still cannot be sure how the [word] will behave in its native
surroundings.”55
To be sure, dictionary definitions can be both distinctive and
nuanced. Definitions take several common forms, using concise
analytic formulations, synonymous phrases, and specifications of
what constitute typical or normal uses.56 But although definitions
may identify a prototypical use for a word, they also invariably
include a broader range of acceptable uses. And when that word
appears in a statute, two important aspects of context are impli-
cated beyond definitional meaning.
The first is consideration of what the enacting Congress meant.
It is entirely possible that members of Congress had both prototypic-
al and broader definitional aspects in mind when drafting, debating,
and approving the text. Accordingly, a court may wish to consult the
legislative record rather than “assum[ing] that any instance of a
statutory word that strays from the prototype is necessarily outside
a statute’s scope.”57 The second contextual consideration involves
the statute’s intended audience. Contested statutory terms often
identify a class of activities or things that share more than one
salient feature.58 Accordingly, a court may wish to take account of
54. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994). 
55. A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 74 (1994). 
56. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 49, at 409; JACKSON, supra note 49, at 94-95.
57. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2046
(2005); see, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002-04, 2007-08
(2012) (presenting disagreement over prototypical versus definitional meaning of “inter-
preter”); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-33, 241-44 (1993) (presenting
disagreement over prototypical versus definitional meaning of “use”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 395-402, 410-13 (1991) (presenting disagreement over prototypical versus
definitional meaning of “representative”).
58. See, e.g., Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-32 (concluding that a firearm may be “used” as a
weapon or as an instrument for barter); Chisom, 501 U.S. at 398-400 (concluding that a
“representative,” as an individual who has prevailed in a popular election, may cover elected
judges as well as legislators).
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the audience to whom the word or provision is addressed when
deciding which feature is determinative.59 
For example, consider the meaning of the word “interpreter” in a
federal statute that authorizes district courts to include “compensa-
tion of interpreters” among the costs that may be awarded to
prevailing parties.60 In Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the
Court relied primarily on dictionaries to conclude that the ordinary
meaning of “interpreter” covers oral translation but not the costs of
translating documents.61 The majority opinion based its ordinary
meaning conclusion on a survey of fourteen dictionaries—ten
general dictionaries and four legal dictionaries.62
The majority recognized that numerous dictionaries defined
“interpreter” simply as someone who translates orally.63 On the
other hand, the Court found many others were more expansive,
referencing the interpretation of words written or spoken,64 or
describing a person who translates, “esp orally[,]”65 from one
language to another. The majority invoked a usage explanation of
“esp” contained in a separate volume supplementing one of these
dictionaries, and reasoned that because, under this explanation,
oral translation was “the most common meaning” of interpreter, it
should be deemed the ordinary meaning.66
59. See In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (discussing
why meaning of “mower” in Wisconsin statute that exempts certain agricultural equipment
from debtor’s civil judgment obligations has changed over time, based primarily on audience
of farm operators at whom law is aimed); see also Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517
(N.C. 2001) (stating that taxing provisions are interpreted in favor of the taxpayer).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) (2006) (as amended by the Court Interpreters Act of 1978).
61. 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2007 (2012).
62. See id. at 2002-04, 2003 n.2 (Alito, J., majority). This review of fourteen dictionaries
is highly anomalous; the Court usually consults only one or two dictionaries in its opinions.
See infra Part III.B.
63. Id. at 2002-03 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE 685 (1978); CHAMBERS TWENTIETH CENTURY
686 (1973);  5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 416 (1933); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 953, 954
(4th ed. 1968); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 565 (1888); B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF
TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 639 (1878)).
64. Id. (citing BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (3d ed. 1969)).
65. Id. at 2002-03, 2003 n.2 (citing CASSELL’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 617 (4th ed. 1969);
CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 566 (6th ed. 1976); FUNK & WAGNALL’S
NEW COM-PREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1977);
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1182 (1976); 1 WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY
1103 (C. Barnhart & R. Barnhart eds., 1977)).
66. Id. at 2003 (quoting 12,000 WORDS: A SUPPLEMENT TO WEBSTER’S THIRD 15a (1986)).
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Rather than focusing so heavily on the dictionary, the Court
might have instead begun by considering the legal audience at
which the statutory section authorizing costs is aimed, namely
district courts. Parenthetically, a focus on legal dictionaries as more
relevant than general dictionaries might have left the semantic
inquiry in equipoise.67 More important, district judges have awarded
document translation and oral translation costs for decades under
the federal statute, both prior to and following the 1978 enactment
of language authorizing compensation for interpreters.68 As district
courts have recognized, court interpreters operate in order to assure
that relevant foreign-language communications are accessible to the
court and the parties. In fulfilling this responsibility, interpreters
often perform tasks in the courtroom that require both oral and
written translation work.69 Perhaps the prevailing pre-Act and post-
Act understandings among district courts regarding court interpret-
ers should matter more than even a thorough review of dictionary
definitions.
Similarly, the Court might have focused on Congress’s purpose in
enacting the 1978 Court Interpreters Act. The law was evidently
meant to expand access to interpretation services in order to “insure
that all participants in our Federal courts can meaningfully take
part.”70 This purpose does not seem compatible with an interpreta-
67. Of the two twentieth-century legal dictionaries the majority invoked, Ballentine’s 1969
edition defined interpreter as “one who interprets words written or spoken in a foreign
language,” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (3d ed. 1969), whereas Black’s 1968 edition
defined interpreter as someone “sworn at a trial to interpret the evidence of a foreigner ... to
the court” adding that “interpret” meant, in relevant part, “to translate orally,” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 953-54 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The definition in a later Black’s edition was broader,
referencing “a person who translates, esp. orally, from one language to another.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 838 (8th ed. 2004). One might infer that this broadening reflects an appreciation
for developing district court practices, especially given that Black’s derives its definitions from
a review of court decisions. See infra Part II.B.2. The majority focused on dictionaries
published around the time of the 1978 Court Interpreters Act, so it probably did not consider
any post-1978 changes to be relevant. Yet, insofar as the majority’s choice of dictionaries
targets the enacting Congress, its refusal to consider evidence of contemporary district court
practices or legislative purpose is troubling.
68. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing multiple lower
court decisions before and after 1978).
69. See id. at 2010 (discussing in-court sight translation facilitated by written translation
preparatory work, and transcribing a foreign language recording in order to translate it in
court).
70. See id. at 2009 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-569, at 1 (1977)).
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tion that eliminates access to cost awards for all document transla-
tion when such access had been available before 1978.
The Court’s holding in Taniguchi may well be supportable based
on one or both of these non-lexicographic settings. But by ap-
proaching dictionary definitions as presumptively authoritative, the
majority effectively preempted considerations of larger context.
Background understandings of the statute’s intended audience and
the statute’s enactors were heavily discounted. For the majority,
dictionary definitions could be overcome only if the larger contextual
evidence established that “Congress must have intended to dispense
with the ordinary meaning of ‘interpreter.’”71
This formulation arguably places the cart before the horse. Many
judges and legal scholars have contended that ordinary meaning in
a statute is not “ordinary” if it fails to accommodate statutory
context from the start.72 We noted earlier that judges using
dictionaries are not discovering the meaning of an unfamiliar word
but rather selecting an appropriate definition for a familiar word
from among multiple options.73 When considering these definitional
choices it would seem that a formative—not simply reactive—factor
should be the context in which the word appears, including the
71. See id. at 2006 (Alito, J., majority) (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012); Easterbrook,
supra note 54, at 67; Randolph, supra note 55, at 73-74; Aprill, supra note 4, at 278; Solan,
supra note 4, at 267-69.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. In recent years, a number of courts have
sought to discover unfamiliar connotations for a familiar word or phrase by referencing the
Urban Dictionary, a crowdsourced collection of definitions for slang words that is available
on the Internet (www.urbandictionary.com). See, e.g., Brown-Baumbach v. B&B Auto. Inc.,
437 F. App’x 129, 135 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (relying on Urban Dictionary to define “to get busy”
as “to have sex” in a sexual harassment case); State v. Lumpkins, 2013 WL 1296746, at *4
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2013) (relying on Urban Dictionary to define “jack” as “to steal” in
appeal from an armed robbery conviction). 
Some observers have raised quality control reservations about Urban Dictionary, noting
that unlike Wikipedia and other crowdsourced websites, its definitions cannot be edited or
removed even when they are incorrect. See Pedro Celis, Should Courts Use Urban Dictionary
to Define Slang?, LAW, TECH. & ARTS BLOG (July 8, 2013), http://wjlta.wordpress.
com/2013/07/08/should-courts-use-urban-dictionary-to-define-slang/. In addition, “funny” is
apparently the primary reason people vote for an Urban Dictionary Entry, which reinforces
quality control concerns. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at A1. See generally Jason C. Miller &
Hannah B. Murray, Wikipedia in Court: When and How Citing Wikipedia and Other
Consensus Websites is Appropriate, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 635, 653-55 (2010) (advocating
use of Urban Dictionary in some settings because “slang is hard to define and constantly
evolving” but also recognizing risk of inappropriate uses).
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evident or reasonably inferrable intentions and perspectives of
enacting lawmakers and, relatedly, persons at whose conduct the
law is aimed.74
B. The Court’s Indifference to Dictionary Taxonomy
The concern that court inquiries into ordinary meaning may be
systemically undervaluing statutory context relates to the judicial
use of any type of dictionary. In addition, legal scholars have
identified problems related to judicial selection of certain kinds of
dictionaries rather than others. A diverse taxonomy exists among
dictionaries, and lexicographers have emphasized the importance of
these differences.75 We focus here on certain sets of distinctions
potentially implicated by the Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries in
our dataset.
1. Prescriptive Versus Descriptive Dictionaries
There is a longstanding debate involving lexicographers and
commentators as to whether a dictionary’s primary purpose is to
serve as a standard of correctness telling people how they should
use words, or rather as a more neutral describer of how words are
used in daily speech and writing.76 The debate achieved popular
74. See Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 631, 644-
45 (2005) (arguing that word meaning is inextricably bound up with the intentions of the
word’s author—a dictionary provides a record of the intentions of prior speakers when using
a certain word, whereas a statutory text means only what its authors intend). It also is worth
noting that congressional lawmakers have not incorporated dictionaries as an approved
source for interpreting their enacted texts, nor do they appear to consult dictionary definitions
when drafting statutes. See Aprill, supra note 4, at 299; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: An Empirical Study of Legislative
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 938 (2013); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact Finding Model
of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1320-21 (1990).
75. See generally ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 49, at 24-27 (surveying types of
dictionaries); SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 7-42
(2d ed. 2001) (same).
76. See generally Thumma & Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress, supra note
3, at 242. Some early dictionaries identified a correct or proper way to use particular words,
and correspondingly stigmatized certain alternative uses, or other words. See JACKSON, supra
note 49, at 64-65; HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE’S
CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 6-7, 84-86, 138-39 (1994).
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currency when Webster’s Third New International Dictionary was
published in 1961 as an avowedly descriptive volume that mini-
mized or withheld editorial judgments in contrast to some of its
predecessors.77 This was followed by publication of the American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language in 1969, proclaiming
that “in these permissive times ... it would add the essential
dimension of guidance” by employing “usage context indicators such
as ‘slang,’ ‘nonstandard,’ or ‘regional.’”78
The distinction between prescriptive and descriptive dictionaries
in recent decades was never as substantive as the rhetoric suggests.
Dictionary users tend to assume that definitions are largely
prescriptive whereas lexicographers view meaning as dependent on
usage.79 In the twenty-first century, all general dictionaries are
fundamentally descriptive; differences between Webster’s Third and
American Heritage are likely to be relatively modest, involving
usage labels such as “nonstandard” or “erroneous” with respect to
certain words rather than wholesale conflicts in definitional ap-
proaches.80 
The distinction, however, does seem to matter to certain Justices,
particularly Justice Scalia. As we explain in Part III, Scalia relies
on Webster’s Second and American Heritage—identified as belong-
ing to the prescriptive camp—far more than Webster’s Third, the
poster child for descriptive dictionaries. This preference is not
77. See MORTON, supra note 76, at 79, 87-88. The backlash to Webster’s Third Edition was
both immediate and widespread. See, e.g., Wilson Follett, Sabotage in Springfield: Webster’s
Third Edition, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1962, at 73; Sydney J. Harris, Good English
Ain’t What We Thought, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 20, 1961, at 10; Webster’s New Word Book,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1961, at 28; see also Geoffrey Nunberg, When a Dictionary Could Outrage,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, at 35.
78. William Morris, Introduction, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE vi-vii (William Morris ed., 1969).
79. See MORTON, supra note 76, at 85; E-mail from American Dialect Society, on Behalf
of Jonathan Lighter, to author (Aug. 30, 2012, 10:39 EST) (on file with author).
80. See E-mail from Steven Pinker, Chair of American Heritage Usage Panel, to author
(Aug. 30, 2012, 13:29 EST) (on file with author); see also Steven Pinker, False Fronts in
Language Wars, SLATE (May 31, 2012, 6:50 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/the_good_
word/2012/05/steven_pinker_on_the_false_fronts_in_the_language_wars_.html (discussing
arguments regarding viewing dictionaries as prescriptive rather than descriptive and vice
versa); Posting of Steve Kleinedler, Executive Editor of the American Heritage Dictionary, to
ADS-L@LISTSERV.UGA.EDU (Aug. 30, 2012) (on file with author) (discussing the American
Heritage Dictionary’s databases).
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inadvertent: Scalia has disparaged Webster’s Third in his opinions
as “widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper
usage”81 and in his recent book as “notoriously permissive.”82 To the
extent that Justice Scalia acts on his criticism by regularly prefer-
ring certain dictionaries to others, this principled preference may
operate to constrain a purely subjective approach. On the other
hand, if Justice Scalia’s choice of definitions reflects a distaste for
“permissive” or “improper” usages, he may be expressing a belief
that dictionaries can and should produce a correct meaning for
statutory terms.
2. General Versus Legal Dictionaries
Unlike general dictionaries that rely on citation files or electronic
corpora to identify word usages,83 legal dictionaries such as Black’s
rely on judicial opinions as their primary citation source.84 As
Professor Ellen Aprill has observed, this is closer to a prescriptive
definitional approach in that judicial interpretations are self-
conscious efforts by experts to establish what words are supposed to
mean, rather than collected examples of word usage from a wider
spectrum.85 Moreover, insofar as Black’s is in large part a synopsis
of court opinions, it is puzzling that the Justices would rely on a
dictionary editor’s characterization of judicial materials rather
than analyzing those materials themselves.86 Still, if legal dictio-
nary definitions reflect some form of consensus among courts, they
might be viewed as superseding general dictionary definitions in
the identification of ordinary meaning for law-related words or
phrases.87 Alternatively, one might regard the two dictionary
81. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 n.3 (1994).
82. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 418.
83. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 49, at 48-57 (discussing two main forms of
empirical language data used by lexicographers and describing shift after 1980 from reliance
on millions of collected citation files to reliance on electronic corpora designed to capture
objective evidence of language in use).
84. See generally Aprill, supra note 4, at 303-10 (discussing development of American law
dictionaries from mid-nineteenth century to present).
85. See id. at 309.
86. We are indebted to Larry Solan for this insight.
87. Even with judicial consensus as to a word’s accepted meaning, changes in legal usage
by courts, legislatures, or agencies may result in that word acquiring a different meaning in
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approaches as complementary, given that general dictionaries may
at times define a law-related word in more detailed or fine-grained
terms than a legal dictionary does.88
Legal scholars have criticized the Court’s inconsistency and lack
of explanation regarding when it views a legal dictionary as a
relevant source and also why it opts to rely in particular instances
on a legal dictionary alone, as opposed to a general dictionary alone,
or both types of dictionaries.89 The Court’s practices in our dataset
lend support to these criticisms. The Justices invoke Black’s to
define traditional legal terms such as “motion”90 and “felony,”91 but
also for common words like “use”92 and “occur.”93 And with respect
to more technical law-related terms, the Court sometimes looks for
meaning in legal dictionaries alone,94 sometimes in general dic-
tionaries alone,95 and sometimes in both.96 Whether the Justices
believe that these two different types of dictionaries perform dis-
tinct functions in pursuit of ordinary meaning or they are simply
interchangeable remains a mystery. 
a specific legal setting. See Aprill, supra note 4, at 309. The preface to Black’s sixth edition
(1990) included a cautionary note that “[t]he language of the law is ever-changing” and
“[a]ccordingly, a legal dictionary should only be used as a starting point for definitions.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY iv (6th ed. 1990). Neither the seventh nor the eighth editions include
this prefatory warning. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ix-xviii (8th ed. 2004) (including preface
to 7th ed. 1999).
88. For example, Webster’s Third defines “procedure” in greater depth than does Black’s
eighth edition, but the reverse is true for “restitution.” Compare WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1807, 1936 (1961), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1241, 1339-40
(8th ed. 2004).
89. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 4, at 310-12; Weinstein, supra note 4, at 657-58.
90. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 (1996) (defining “motion”).
91. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010) (defining “felony”).
92. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (defining “use”).
93. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 & n.5 (2002) (defining
“occur”).
94. See, e.g., Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 504 (2000) (defining “civil conspiracy”); United
States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992) (defining “testimony”).
95. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331
(2011) (defining “file”); id. at 1337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining “file” and “complaint”);
Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 801 (1993) (defining “boycott”).
96. See, e.g., Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (2011) (defining “imprison-
ment”); New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2642 (2010) (defining “quorum”); Cuellar
v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 558 (2008) (defining “laundering”).
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3. Dictionary Editions: Time of Enactment Versus Time of   
Case Filing
When choosing which dictionary edition to consult, there is a
distinction that implicates larger interpretive disagreements within
the Court. If the focus is ordinary meaning as presumptively
understood by the Congress that voted for the statute, then
dictionaries from around the time of enactment are preferable.97
This historical approach would seem appealing to intentionalist
Justices who take seriously the idea that legislatures have a
purpose when choosing to enact into law certain words of protection
or regulation. The historical perspective also may be attractive to
textualists who believe that the ordinary meaning of the words
when enacted is pivotal in interpretive terms.
On the other hand, if the focus is on ordinary meaning as
presumptively understood by citizens living under the statute today,
one would prefer dictionaries from around the time the case before
the Court was filed. This contemporaneous approach would seem
appealing to Justices who believe statutes have a dynamic compo-
nent in that the meaning of words may evolve with changes in
societal conditions. It also should be attractive to pragmatic Justices
concerned that the “notice” function of ordinary meaning should
extend to today’s citizens, not those living decades earlier when the
words were enacted. Reliance on contemporaneous dictionaries
might even appeal to textualists to the extent they believe that
ordinary meaning is best understood as applicable to current rather
than historical users.
Admittedly, the dichotomy between dictionaries dating from time
of enactment and time of filing is not quite this clean. Many
dictionary definitions either do not change from one edition to the
next or are copied from other dictionaries, and definitions in
contemporary dictionaries therefore may be years if not decades
old.98 Further, because language is constantly changing, and it takes
97. See Aprill, supra note 4, at 332-33; Thumma & Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become
a Fortress, supra note 3, at 272-74; Looking It Up, supra note 4, at 1446-47; Rubin, supra note
4, at 186-88.
98. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 187 n.22; see generally ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 49,
at 47 (observing that “[l]anguage in use ... is a moving target”).
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time to assemble a thorough collection of uses for a word, dictionar-
ies published around the time of enactment will likely rely on
definitions from years earlier.99 Accordingly, intentionalist or
textualist Justices searching for word meaning as understood by the
enacting Congress should refer to dictionaries from several years
after the enactment date.100
Nonetheless, differences between the two periods are cognizable
even if blurred at the margins, and one might expect some Justices
to articulate a principled preference between these distinct options.
Once again, the Justices have not done so. Indeed, the dictionaries
they cite often are not contemporaneous with either the enactment
date or filing date. This suggests a larger lack of interest by the
Court in aligning its dictionary use with factors relevant to individ-
ual cases. One can find occasional ad hoc articulations of why
enactment date dictionaries are relevant,101 but the Court is far from
consistent in its choices. Our dataset reflects this inconsistency.
4. Other Distinctions: Dictionary Size and Definition Order
In addition to substantial differences in types of dictionaries and
dates of publication, dictionaries vary considerably in size. Although
there is no consensus as to the number of words in the English
language, lexicographers estimate the total to be two million or
more.102 Even the largest unabridged American dictionaries contain
well under half this total.103 Abridged and collegiate dictionaries
99. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 186-87. 
100. See Aprill, supra note 4, at 332. How often the meaning of a contested statutory term
changes substantially over time is an empirical question that we did not explore. For
instances of such evolutionary change, see, for example, Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.
103, 105 (1990) (applying the term “falsely made,” enacted in a 1948 statute, to transactions
in the late 1980s). See also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1931) (holding that
theft of an airplane was not covered as a “vehicle” under 1922 statute criminalizing
transportation of stolen vehicles across state lines). The McBoyle holding might well be
different in 2013. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 153-55 (2010)
(discussing whether the McBoyle court would reach the same holding today).
101. See, e.g., BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) (Alito, J.); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988) (Stevens, J.); Saint Francis
Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987) (White, J.).
102. See LANDAU, supra note 75, at 28-29.
103. Webster’s Second New International (1934) contains 600,000 words while Webster’s
Third has 450,000. See MORTON, supra note 76, at 50-51, 153.
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include a smaller number of words and—more relevant—they
contain fewer and shorter definitions for these words.104 In general,
all dictionaries must deal with space limitations that affect the
usage listings and amplifications contained in their definitions.105 
Supreme Court cases do not address the consequences of these
variable constraints related to size. Opinions that invoke definitions
from collegiate or other abridged dictionaries are silent on the
likelihood that the definitions will omit certain uses of words “[a]s
a result of the need for abstraction, breadth, and brevity.”106
Nonetheless, the Justices’ choice of dictionaries can yield sharp
differences in the meaning of key words.107 The very recent dictio-
nary conflict over the definition of “interpreter” is one recent
illustration,108 and numerous other examples exist in cases from our
dataset.109
Finally, English-language words that have been written and
spoken for an appreciable period of time tend to develop multiple
senses or significations. As one dictionary preface explains, the
initial historical usage “has been gradually extended to include
allied or associated ideas, or transferred boldly to figurative and
analogical uses.”110 Faced with a series of distinct yet often intri-
cately related senses, dictionary editors must decide on some
104. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 4, at 295-96 (reporting that definitions for “exercise” in a
popular collegiate edition do not include any reference to the practice of religion); see generally
LANDAU, supra note 75, at 121.
105. See LANDAU, supra note 75, at 248; Aprill, supra note 4, at 297.
106. Aprill, supra note 4, at 296.
107. Compare Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331
(2011) (Breyer, J.) (defining “file”), with id. at 1338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing
definition of “file”); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1997) (Breyer, J.) (defining
“carry”), with id. at 142 n.2, 143 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing definition of
“carry”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1993) (Scalia, J.) (defining
“modify”), with id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing definition of “modify”).
108. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (discussing Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific
Saipan, 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012)).
109. Compare, e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144 (2008) (Breyer, J.) (defining
“otherwise”), with id. at 159 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing definition of “otherwise”);
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706 (2000) (Souter, J.) (defining “revoke”), with id.
at 715-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing definition of “revoke”); McLaughlin v. Richland
Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (defining “willful”), with id. at 137 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (discussing definition of “willful”).
110. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxviii (2d ed. 1989) (discussing historical usage in the
general explanations section).
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principled basis for presenting an order of definitions that is
recognizable and useful to readers.
At least three options are available: historical order, with the first
sense listed being the earliest ascertainable; frequency of use, with
the first sense listed being the one that recurs most often; or
structural coherence, explained in one dictionary preface as “an
effort to arrange a complex word in a psychologically meaningful
order ... so that the word can to some extent be perceived as a
structured unit rather than a string of unrelated senses.”111 Of the
four general dictionaries used most regularly by the Court in our
dataset, none invokes frequency of use to establish definitional
sequencing. Three rely on some version of historical order, and the
fourth relies on structural coherence.112 
By contrast, the Justices often simply assume that frequency of
use is the standard organizing principle for definitional order. For
instance, Justice Breyer, in Muscarello, emphasized his reliance on
the “first definition” of the word “carry” in the Oxford English
Dictionary and Webster’s Third as though this signifies the
principal or typical use of the word.113 Justice Thomas, in the
General Land Dynamics Systems dissent, referred to a “secondary
meaning” of “age” in Webster’s Third and American Heritage as “of
course, less commonly used than the primary meaning.”114 And Chief
Justice Roberts recently disparaged Justice Ginsburg’s reliance on
a definition of “regulate” from the time of the Constitution’s drafting
because it was the “second-alternative definition” listed.115
111. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY xlvi (1981).
112. For historical order, see 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxvii-xxix (2d ed. 1989);
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY xv (2d ed. 1959); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 18a (1961). Webster’s Third and Oxford English acknowledge that
development after the initial sense is often complex and not readily represented in a linear
historical series. For structural coherence, see AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY xlvi (1981).
113. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998).
114. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 603 (2004) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
115. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-87 n.4 (2012) (emphasis
added). The dictionary invoked by Chief Justice Roberts, Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the
English Language, relied on historical order. See SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1 A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE vii (6th ed. 1785). Only two senses of “regulate” are listed: “[t]o adjust by
rule or method” and “to direct.” For the second sense, Johnson uses illustrative quotations
from seventeenth-century surgeon Richard Wiseman (“Regulate the patient in his manner of
living”) and seventeenth-century poet John Dryden (“no wife has power to regulate her
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These examples of apparent insensitivity to how dictionaries
establish priorities in definitional order are not isolated
occurrences.116 One might conclude that, along with the indetermi-
nacy regarding legal versus general dictionaries and the choice of
dictionary edition, the examples are emblematic. The Justices may
simply be indifferent to the multiple and often subtle distinctions
that characterize the nature of the dictionaries on which they
regularly rely. 
C. Justice Scalia’s Indirect Efforts at Rebuttal
At least one Supreme Court Justice has expressed awareness of
certain risks associated with indiscriminate dictionary usage by
courts. In his recent book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts, co-authored with Bryan A. Garner, Justice Scalia cautions
against careless reliance on dictionaries.117 He lists a series of
principles that courts should bear in mind: notably, that context
matters because words used in statutes have more than one
definitional meaning, that a dictionary’s prefatory material can
provide enlightenment as to the order in which a word’s several
senses are presented, and that because dictionaries often lag behind
developments in language, it is wise to consult a dictionary several
years later than the date a contested word was enacted.118 Some of
Scalia’s own opinions using dictionaries expressly adhere to his
principles119 and he is willing to chide colleagues who fail to do so.120
husband’s life”). 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE cdlxxvi (6th ed. 1785). This
“second-alternative” definition seems to have been well established at the time of the
Constitution.
116. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1991 (2010) (Kennedy, J.); id. at 2001-02
n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989) (White,
J.); id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 417-18.
118. See id. at 418-19.
119. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(drawing word meaning from context where dictionary definitions result in ambiguity); Deal
v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993).
120. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 & n.3 (1994) (crit-
icizing particular dictionary relied upon by petitioners and also by Justice Stevens in dissent);
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 418 & n.18 (criticizing Justice Breyer majority opinion for
erroneously concluding that first meaning listed in an Oxford English definition signified the
word’s primary meaning).
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Despite the cautionary advice from one of its most frequent
dictionary users, the Court as a whole continues to be chastised for
careless or irresponsible use of dictionaries. Indeed, Justice Scalia
is a principal target of some critics—for ignoring key elements of
larger statutory context, for dismissing or discounting alternative
definitions in respected dictionaries, and for failing to consider the
time-lag problem.121 Moreover, the conceptual criticisms summa-
rized in this Part have been expressed by judges and legal scholars
for the better part of two decades.122 The fact that the Court has
steadily increased its dictionary reliance over the same period while
continuing to operate in detachment from these criticisms suggests
that what is at stake goes beyond inattentive interpretive conduct.
The Justices may have subconsciously agreed on a resource that
promotes their collective self-image as authoritative and objective
while allowing them to use this resource individually to pursue
subjective ends, in particular to support outcomes they prefer for
other reasons. The prospect that dictionaries are being used in a
fundamentally subjective way, rather than as a neutral interpretive
asset, takes us to a detailed examination of our findings.
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON DICTIONARY USE
We turn now to the actual patterns of dictionary usage by the
Justices.123 As noted earlier, our inquiry focuses on three broad
fields of law, which we label criminal, business and commercial, and
labor and employment. The fields are essentially defined by the
sections of the U.S. Code that the Court interpreted: 18 U.S.C. for
121. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 4, at 317 & n.224 (questioning Scalia’s reliance in his
dissent in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991), on a single 1934 edition of a dictionary
to reject a 1982 statutory usage that later dictionaries recognized as proper); id. at 327-28 &
n.293 (criticizing Scalia’s reliance in his majority in MCI Telecommunications on a single
definition as establishing lack of ambiguity when creditable alternative definitions
established ambiguity that might have triggered agency deference);  SOLAN, supra note 100,
at 67-70 (expressing concerns about the same two Scalia opinions). 
122. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 61; Randolph, supra note 55, at 71-72;
Zeppos, supra note 74, at 1299; Looking It Up, supra note 4, at 1437-38.
123. In this Section, we focus primarily on the use of dictionaries in the Court’s majority
opinions. When we do not indicate otherwise, the findings that we describe are from those
majority opinions, and we indicate explicitly when we analyze concurring and dissenting
opinions separately or combine them with majority opinions.
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criminal, 15 U.S.C. for business and commercial, and a more diverse
set of titles and sections for labor and employment.124 All decisions
on the merits that met these criteria in the 1986-2010 Terms of the
Court, a total of 695, were identified and analyzed.125
We divided the study period into three parts. We subdivided the
Rehnquist Court into an early period (1986-1991 Terms) and a later
period (1992-2004 Terms) because our initial exploration of
dictionary use suggested that the first several Terms of the
Rehnquist Court may have been a period of transition in the
Justices’ employment of dictionary definitions. The Roberts
Court—2005-2010 Terms—constituted the final part. 
As a first step, we determined whether the Court’s majority
opinion cited at least one dictionary of any type.126 We then
compared cases in which dictionaries were cited as a basis for
interpretation of the statutory provision in question with cases in
which there was no dictionary citation. If the majority opinion cited
a dictionary, we also examined separate opinions to determine
whether they responded with their own dictionary citations. We
present these analyses in Section A. 
Section B focuses on the opinions that do cite dictionaries. Within
our three fields of law, 117 majority opinions during the 1986-2010
Terms cited dictionaries, as did twenty-seven separate opinions in
the same cases. Within this set of cases, we analyze several
attributes of the ways that dictionaries were used—overall, among
124. For brevity’s sake, we often use “labor” to refer to “labor and employment” and
“commercial” to refer to “business and commercial.” The criteria for selection of labor cases
are fully described in Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 28, at 15-18. Selection focused on
controversies that affected employees in their status as employees. These cases almost always
involved employers and/or unions as well, although occasionally they concerned the
immigration effects or tax consequences of an employment-based event. 
In terms of their subject matter, the overwhelming majority of cases in the criminal
category involved criminal prosecutions, but a handful arose in other contexts such as civil
actions under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68 (2012). Most of the business and commercial cases involved government regulation of
business practices; roughly half concerned securities law and antitrust law. The labor and
employment cases were varied in subject matter, with the largest concentrations of cases
involving employment discrimination and labor-management relations. 
125. There were 226 decisions in the 1986-91 Terms, 319 in 1992-2004, and 150 in 2005-
2010. Across the three periods, there were 362 labor and employment decisions, 115 business
and commercial decisions, and 218 criminal decisions.
126. We included plurality opinions, of which there were a small number. 
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fields of law, and with respect to individual Justices.127 For a sample
of cases, we extend our analysis to the relationship between the
dictionary definitions offered to the Justices in the parties’ briefs
and the definitions they actually cite in their opinions.
In Section C, we probe the implications of our findings. We
examine what they tell us about the Justices’ use of dictionaries in
statutory interpretation. In particular, we discuss what the patterns
that we found suggest about whether dictionaries are used as means
to reach judgments rather than as means to provide support for
judgments made on other bases. 
A. How Much Do the Justices Use Dictionaries?
In our three fields of law across the twenty-five Terms from 1986
through 2010, the Court decided 695 cases. Among those cases, one-
sixth of the Court’s majority opinions—16.8 percent—cited dictio-
nary definitions of words in statutes that the Court interpreted. 
1. Broad Patterns of Usage 
As shown in Figure 1 in Part I, the rates of usage varied consider-
ably across fields and over time. Table 1 presents these rates in
tabular form.
127. For each opinion, we coded the field of law, author, and Court term as well as several
types of information about the dictionary citation(s) in the opinion: the number of words in
the statute for which dictionary definitions were cited; the total number of references to
dictionaries in the opinion and the total number of dictionaries cited; whether the dictionary
that was cited was published close to the time of enactment of the statute or close to the time
in which the case was first filed in court; and the specific dictionaries that were cited in the
opinion. We classified dictionaries as general, legal, and technical. We also classified general
dictionaries as prescriptive or descriptive. 
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Table 1. Rates of Dictionary Use in Majority Opinions, by
Period and Field of Law
Field Period (in Terms) Total
1986-91 1992-2004 2005-2010
Labor   5.8 13.0 19.1 11.3
Commercial 11.4 20.5 25.9 18.3
Criminal 11.4 23.7 38.3 25.2
Total   8.0 17.9 28.0 16.8
There was a clear and strong trend toward more frequent usage,
as the proportion of majority opinions with at least one reference to
a dictionary definition more than tripled between the first and last
periods of the study.128 It is noteworthy that five of the seven Terms
with the highest rates of dictionary usage were the last five Terms
in the study. The rates increased in each of those Terms, and the
three highest rates came in 2008 (30.4 percent), 2009 (31.3 percent),
128. For the relationship between time period and dictionary use, Kendall’s tau-b was .184
and the relationship was statistically significant at the .001 level (i.e., p<.001). To probe
temporal patterns further and more systematically, we analyzed rates of dictionary usage by
term. For the relationship between year and usage, tau-b was .144, p<.001. There was
considerable fluctuation in annual rates, which we would expect because of the relatively
small numbers of decisions per year. 
We will report levels of strength and statistical significance for all relationships between
variables that we discuss. Our tests of statistical significance are two-tailed, meaning that for
analytic purposes we are not imposing an expectation that the relationship between two
variables was in one direction rather than the other. Statistical significance is only one
criterion for assessment of the relationship between one variable and another. When there
are relatively small numbers of cases in an analysis, as is true of some of the analyses in this
Part, relationships that are substantively important may not meet the standard criterion of
significance at the .05 level. Still, statistical significance is a helpful mechanism to avoid
making too much of relationships that are likely not meaningful. On the value and limits of
significance tests, see THE SIGNIFICANCE TEST CONTROVERSY: A READER ix-xi (Denton E.
Morrison & Ramon E. Henkel eds., 1970).
For relationships involving variables with more than two categories and in which the
categories of the variable have no particular order (such as the three fields of law) and for
relationships between two dichotomous variables (in which each variable has only two
values), we used the chi-square (X2) statistic to determine statistical significance. For
relationships between two ordinal variables (such as the three time periods) when at least one
variable is not dichotomous, we used Kendall’s tau-b statistic to determine statistical
significance. On the properties of measures of association between variables, see Herbert F.
Weisberg, Models of Statistical Relationship, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1638 (1974).
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and 2010 (39.3 percent), averaging 33.7 percent for the 2008-2010
Terms.
In each of the three fields of law, the rate of dictionary usage
increased from the first to the second period and from the second to
the third period. These increases were statistically significant in the
labor and criminal law fields, and the differences among the fields
also were statistically significant.129 The overall rate of dictionary
use in criminal law was more than twice the rate in labor, with
commercial law about halfway between.130 Criminal law ranked
highest and labor law lowest in dictionary use in all three periods,
although criminal and  commercial law were tied for highest in the
first period and the difference between those two fields did not
become substantial until the advent of the Roberts Court.131
2. Usage by Different Justices 
As authors of the Court’s majority opinions, the Justices differed
in their propensity to cite dictionary definitions. Table 2 shows the
rates of dictionary use by Justice. 
129. For differences across time periods in labor and employment cases, tau-b=.145,
p=.004; in criminal cases, tau-b=.205, p<.001; in business and commercial cases, tau-b=.142,
p=.104. The lack of statistical significance by the conventional .05 standard for business and
commercial cases despite a fairly strong relationship was due to the relatively small number
of these cases. 
130. For differences among the three fields, X2=18.98, p<.001.
131. The differences among the fields were not statistically significant within any of the
three periods because of the relatively small numbers of cases in fields within periods; these
differences were more substantial and approached the conventional .05 criterion for statistical
significance in the second and third periods. For the first period, X2=2.27, p=.321; for the
second period, X2=5.38, p=.068; for the third period, X2=5.74, p=.057.
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Table 2. Proportions of Majority Opinions Citing 
Dictionaries, by Justice132
 Justice
Percent of
majority
opinions
citing
dictionaries
Number of
majority
opinions  Justice
Percent of
majority
opinions
citing
dictionaries
Number of
majority
opinions
 Brennan  12.5  24  Kennedy   9.0  67
 White    6.9  29  Souter 22.8  57
 Marshall  13.0  23  Thomas   27.8*  54
 Blackmun  11.1  36  Ginsburg  14.3  42
 Powell    0.0    6  Breyer  21.7  60
 Rehnquist  10.0  40  Roberts  35.7  14
 Stevens  11.4  70  Alito  33.3    9
 O’Connor  17.8  73  Sotomayor  25.0    8
 Scalia    27.6*  58  Kagan  50.0    2
The dominant pattern is one of higher usage rates for Justices
who served later in the study period, although Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Kennedy are exceptions. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito stand out for their high
rates, but the proportions for Roberts and Alito should be inter-
preted with caution because of their small numbers of opinions in
these three fields.133
The tendency for later-serving Justices to have higher rates of
dictionary usage raises the question as to whether the substantial
increase in those rates over time is primarily a function of changes
in the Court’s membership. We explore that question by breaking
132. Justices are listed in order of year of appointment. Percentages are in italics for
Justices with fewer than ten majority opinions. Per curiam opinions are omitted. Rates of
dictionary usage for individual Justices that differed from the rates of all the other Justices,
taken together, to a degree that was statistically significant (p<.05) are indicated with
asterisks.
133. The differences among all the Justices in the rates at which they cited dictionaries in
majority opinions were statistically significant by the .05 standard (X2=28.86, p=.036). When
each Justice was compared with all the other Justices as a group, Justice Scalia’s relatively
high rate was statistically significant (X2=4.57, p=.033), and the same was true of Justice
Thomas (X2=4.39, p=.036). The high rate for Chief Justice Roberts came close to meeting the
.05 criterion (X2=3.33, p=.070), despite the small number of majority opinions that he wrote
in these fields. No Justice had a rate sufficiently below the rate for other Justices to make the
difference statistically significant. The absence of any such lower rate is one indicator that a
“dictionary culture” has emerged at the Court. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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down the Justices’ rates of usage by time period, shown in Table 3.
The pattern is mixed.
Table 3. Proportions of Majority Opinions Citing 
Dictionaries, by Justice and Time Period134
Terms Terms
Justice
1986-
1991
1992-
2004
2005-
2010 Justice
1986-
1991
1992-
2004
2005-
2010
Brennan 12.5 Kennedy   0.0  8.6 23.1
White   7.4  0.0 Souter 11.1 17.1 46.2*
Marshall  13.0 Thomas 33.3 24.3 35.7
Blackmun    0.0  44.4* Ginsburg   8.0 23.5
Powell   0.0 Breyer 17.1 28.0
Rehnquist   8.3 10.7 Roberts 35.7
Stevens   8.3 13.3 12.5 Alito 33.3
O’Connor   6.7   25.6* Sotomayor 25.0
Scalia 18.8 31.0 30.8 Kagan 50.0
All Decisions   8.0 17.9 28.0
In general, Justices who served in multiple periods showed
increases in their usage rates. The increases in Justice O’Connor’s
and Justice Scalia’s rates between the first and second periods and
in Justice Kennedy’s, Justice Ginsburg’s, and Justice Souter’s rates
between the second and third periods are striking. Other Justices
whose increases across periods are noteworthy include Justice
Blackmun and Justice Breyer. As the table shows, only three of the
increases were statistically significant, primarily because of the
relatively small numbers of majority opinions that some Justices
wrote in some periods, but the general upward movement is clear.135
134. Justices are listed in order of year of appointment. Percentages are in italics for
Justices with fewer than ten majority opinions in a time period. Per curiam opinions are
omitted as a separate category of dictionary use but included in the total of decisions. Justices
whose rates of dictionary use increased to a statistically significant degree (p<.05) from one
period to the next have asterisks in the period in which the significant increase occurred.
135. Another way to test for the statistical significance of increases is by analyzing the
Justices’ term-by-term rates of dictionary use. This approach identifies significant changes
that may be obscured by the way that the periods are defined. By this criterion, there were
significant increases over time for Justices Blackmun (tau-b=.396, p=.019) and Roberts (tau-
b=.534, p=.002). 
To get an additional sense of dictionary use over time, we analyzed the majority
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At the same time, several of the Justices who first joined the
Court during the Rehnquist and Roberts eras showed relatively high
rates of dictionary usage from the start. In their early years,
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito had substan-
tially higher rates than any holdover Justices from the Burger
Court in the 1986-91 Terms.136 Thus, both membership turnover and
changes in the propensities of continuing members have contributed
to the growing popularity of dictionaries in the Court. These two
sources of change—high usage levels for newer Justices and
increased usage among long-serving Justices—may be connected.
The significantly higher use of dictionaries by Justices Scalia and
Thomas137 may well have encouraged other Justices, over the course
of a number of Terms, to cite dictionaries more often than they had
in the past.
Although Justices differed considerably in their use of dictionar-
ies in all three periods, the differences declined over time.138 Thus,
as dictionary use became more common, the Justices increasingly
converged in their willingness to cite dictionaries in their majority
opinions. We also found that dictionary usage among the three fields
converged in recent Terms when the overall rate of dictionary use
exceeded 33 percent.139 These identified convergences among the
opinions written by Justices Stevens and O’Connor in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
across all fields of law. We chose these two Justices because both served for at least five
Terms in the Burger Court and neither was among the most frequent users of dictionaries in
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. During his eleven Terms on the Burger Court, Stevens 
cited a dictionary in only one majority opinion, but he did so in eight opinions in the 1986-
1991 Terms and in fifteen opinions in the 1992-2004 Terms. The comparable figures for
O’Connor, who served five Terms during the Burger Court, were one, eight, and twenty. These
records indicate a dramatic growth in the use of dictionaries by two Justices who almost never
cited dictionary definitions early in their careers on the Court.
136. Among the holdover Justices from the Burger years, Marshall’s 13.0 percent rate and
Brennan’s 12.5 percent rate were the highest in the 1986-1991 Terms.
137. See Table 2.
138. The coefficient of variation, which measures deviations from the average, was .72 in
the early Rehnquist Court, .47 in the late Rehnquist Court, and .35 in the Roberts Court. The
coefficient of variation (V) is the standard deviation of a set of scores (in this case, the
proportions of majority opinions using dictionaries for each Justice) divided by the mean of
those scores. We excluded Justices with fewer than ten majority opinions from the calculation
of V.
139. During the 2008-2010 Terms, dictionary use was 33.7 percent overall: 37.1 percent for
criminal law cases, 33.3 percent for commercial law cases, and 30.3 percent for labor cases.
Unlike differences among the fields over the entire 2005-2010 period (see Table 1), the recent
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Justices and the fields suggest the development of a pervasive and
comfortable dictionary culture at the Court.140
3. Ideology 
The relationship between the Justices’ ideological positions and
their use of particular interpretive resources has been a matter of
some interest. Most visible is the debate over the use of evidence
about legislative history, a debate that has fallen largely along
ideological lines.141 Because of their tendency to advocate textual-
ism, conservative Justices might cite dictionaries at higher rates
than liberals.
To explore this possibility, we classified the Justices as liberal or
conservative based on the coding of their votes on case outcomes in
the Supreme Court Database, a body of data on attributes of
Supreme Court decisions since the 1946 Term that is archived at
Washington University.142 Although the criteria used in this
database for labeling votes as liberal or conservative are open to
some question,143 on the whole the coding of votes captures the
generally accepted understanding of those ideological labels. The
eighteen Justices who served during our twenty-five-year period
divided into two groups of equal size, those with more than 50
percent liberal votes over their careers through the 2010 Term and
those with more than 50 percent conservative votes.144
differences are not close to statistically significant.
140. See supra note 138 (reporting that no Justice uses dictionaries significantly less often
than the Justices as a group).
141. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 7, at 125-28; Frank H. Easterbrook,
What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441 (1990); Alex Kozinski,
Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807,
807-08 (1998).
142. The archive is located at SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (last
visited Sept. 26, 2013).
143. See Anna L. Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United States
Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 416-17, 420-29 (2013)
(discussing database criteria described at http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=deci
sionDirection).
144. The liberals were Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Souter,
Breyer, Kagan, and Blackmun. The conservatives were Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia,
Alito, Roberts, O’Connor, Powell, Kennedy, and White. Because different Justices decided
different sets of cases, their proportions of liberal and conservative decisions are not fully
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The relationship between ideology and dictionary use was weak.
Conservatives were more likely to cite dictionaries across the three
fields of law (18.3 percent versus 16.5 percent), but that difference
was substantively small, not statistically significant, and inconsis-
tent across the three fields.145 Citation of dictionaries, unlike the use
of legislative history,146 does not differentiate the Justices along
ideological lines.
A second possible relationship between dictionary use and
ideology is that Justices might be more inclined to use dictionaries
in opinions that reflect their general ideological tendencies or,
alternatively, in opinions that counter those tendencies. Any such
inclination is weak at best. For both liberal and conservative
authors of majority opinions, the rate of liberal decisions was four
percentage points higher when they cited a dictionary. Neither
difference came close to achieving statistical significance.147 Nor did
comparable. However, they are sufficiently comparable to make meaningful distinctions
between Justices with liberal tendencies and those with conservative tendencies. Of these
Justices, Blackmun and White were distinctly more moderate than the other justices. When
the relationship between the Justices’ ideological positions and their use of dictionaries was
analyzed with Blackmun and White omitted, the results were quite similar to those in the
analyses that included all the Justices.
145. For all cases, X2=.389, p=.533. Conservatives were more likely than liberals to cite
dictionary definitions in labor and employment law (13.5 percent to 9.6 percent) and criminal
law (28.6 percent to 24.0 percent), but liberals were more likely to cite dictionaries in business
and commercial cases (23.3 percent to 13.2 percent). None of those differences was close to
achieving statistical significance.
146. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220,
226-27 (2006) (reporting that liberal Justices use legislative history more than twice as often
as conservative Justices do).
147. For liberal Justices, X2=.989, p=.320; for conservative Justices, X2=.754, p=.385. The
ideological direction of decisions was defined by the same criteria as the ideological direction
of Justices’ votes. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. For two individual Justices,
there was a statistically significant relationship between dictionary use and direction of the
decision in cases in which they wrote the majority opinion. Justice Ginsburg was more likely
to reach a conservative result when she used a dictionary (X2=5.80, p=.016), and Justice
Breyer was more likely to reach a liberal result (X2=5.88, p=.015). Chief Justice Roberts’
tendency to reach more liberal results when he cited dictionaries approached statistical
significance, even though he wrote only fourteen majority opinions in these fields (X2=3.76,
p=.052). These patterns indicate that there may be something interesting about dictionary
use by these three Justices, but the small number of Justices with significant relationships,
plus the fact that the relationship between dictionary use and outcomes had opposite
directions for Ginsburg and Breyer, reinforce other evidence that any ideological element in
the use of dictionaries is small. For Ginsburg, we speculate that the conservative relationship
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significant differences in outcomes appear within specific fields of
law for either liberals or conservatives.148 This result indicates that
Justices did not employ dictionaries chiefly to justify decisions
reflecting their ideological leanings. At the same time, it indicates
that dictionary use also did not constrain the Justices’ ideological
preferences.149
4. Responses in Dissenting Opinions
In the 117 cases in which majority opinions cited dictionaries,
there were eighty dissenting opinions.150 Of these dissenting
opinions, 28.8 percent cited dictionary definitions.151 That propor-
tion is subject to multiple interpretations. On the one hand, it is
distinctly higher than the 16.8 percent of all majority opinions that
employed dictionaries. On the other hand, we might expect an even
higher proportion for two reasons. The cases in which majority
opinions cited dictionaries are probably more appropriate for such
citations than the average case. Further, a dictionary citation in a
majority opinion could spur a dissenter to answer by using a citation
as well.
may be a product of opinion assignments. Of her five conservative dictionary-using majorities,
three are unanimous decisions in the criminal field; Ginsburg’s overall voting record in
criminal law cases is more liberal. For Breyer, it seems possible that dictionary use helped
attract or retain textualist Justices Scalia and Thomas. Of his eleven liberal dictionary-using
majorities, nine were joined by Scalia and eight by Thomas.
148. The largest difference for both liberal and conservative Justices between opinions
citing to a dictionary and not doing so occurred in the field of commercial law. Because those
cases often involve business disputes between institutional parties, we believe the Supreme
Court Database’s ideological coding in commercial cases is somewhat less reliable than in
criminal cases—almost always prosecution versus defendant—and labor cases—almost
invariably employer versus employee and/or union.
149. Our findings about the relationship between dictionary use and the ideological
direction of decisions are broadly similar to those from a study of the use of canons of
construction in labor and employment law, although that study found some significant effects
of canon use on the ideological direction of decisions by conservative Justices. See Brudney
& Ditslear, supra note 28, at 53-63.
150. We counted opinions that both concurred and dissented as dissenting opinions.
151. There were also fifty-four concurring opinions in these cases, of which only four cited
dictionaries. This infrequent use is not surprising, in that concurring opinions are often
narrowly focused and regular concurring opinions express no disagreement with the majority
opinion.
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The Justices differed considerably in their propensity to cite
dictionaries in this set of dissenting opinions. The most frequent
dissenters were Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer; Stevens cited
a dictionary in only three of twenty-one dissents and Breyer in only
one of twelve. In contrast, Justice Scalia cited a dictionary in six of
ten dissenting opinions and Justice Alito in four of seven.
Largely as a result of those four Justices’ tendencies, there was
a substantial difference between the Justices we have classified as
conservatives and liberals. The conservative Justices cited dictionar-
ies in 41.2 percent of their thirty-four dissenting opinions. Liberals
cited dictionaries in 19.6 percent of their forty-six dissents, less than
half the rate for conservatives. Although the difference is statisti-
cally significant,152 we do not want to overstate its importance. Still,
it is noteworthy that in opinions that are largely individual
expressions, in contrast with opinions for the Court, liberal and
conservative Justices diverge in the extent to which they employ
dictionaries. As we describe in Part IV, even in majority opinions
there are differences between the ways liberals and conservatives
employ dictionaries that simple frequency of use does not capture.
B. Patterns of Dictionary Usage
We turn now from the proportion of opinions that cite dictionary
definitions to the ways that dictionaries are employed when they are
cited. Our focus is the 117 majority opinions in the 1986-2010 Terms
that include at least one citation to a dictionary.
1. Number of Dictionaries Used
In the opinions in which majority opinion writers employed
dictionaries, they typically did so for only a single word. Overall, the
mean number of words defined was 1.30. The number of words
defined per opinion was especially low in labor and employment law
(mean of 1.07), considerably higher in business and commercial law
(1.33), and highest in criminal law (1.45).153 
152. X2=4.46, p=.035.
153. The differences between labor and commercial law and between labor and criminal
law were statistically significant (t=2.30, p=.030 for labor and commercial, t=3.75, p<.001
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In seeking to define these words, the Justices have many
dictionaries from which to choose. How widely do they draw from
the set of available dictionaries? In general, their search for
definitions—or at least what they report from their search—is
narrow.
In our set of majority opinions, a total of 152 words were defined
through dictionary citations. The mean number of dictionaries per
word was 1.58. Sixty-four percent of the words had citations to only
one dictionary, and another 21 percent had citations to two dictio-
naries. More than three dictionaries were cited for only 3 percent of
the words defined. 
Earlier we discussed the Court’s recent decision in Taniguchi v.
Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., in which the majority opinion surveyed
fourteen dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of one
word.154  Whether or not the Court’s use of dictionaries was appropri-
ate in that case, the opinion did develop a broad analysis of the
evidence available from dictionaries. But Taniguchi is distinctly an
outlier in this respect. Ordinarily, the Justices undertake a far more
limited—and thus selective—search for meaning in dictionaries.155
The Justices varied somewhat in their practices. Among the eight
Justices who cited dictionaries in more than five majority opinions,
the mean number of dictionary references for each word defined in
their opinions ranged from 1.28 for O’Connor to 1.94 for Thomas.156
But even the mean for Justice Thomas is low compared with the
number of major dictionaries that are available for consultation. It
appears that the Justices are all highly selective in their use of
dictionaries as evidence about the meaning of statutory language.
for labor and criminal); the difference between commercial and criminal law was not (t=.863,
p=.392). If concurring and dissenting opinions that used dictionaries are included, the overall
mean remains 1.30, and the means for the three fields are similar to those for majority
opinions only: 1.10 for labor law, 1.35 for commercial law, and 1.41 for criminal law.
154. 132 S. Ct. 1977 (2012); see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
155. Because Taniguchi was decided in 2012, and because it fell outside our three areas of
law, it was not included in our study of the Justices’ practices.
156. The other means were 1.64 for Breyer, 1.57 for Ginsburg, 1.67 for Kennedy, 1.52 for
Scalia, 1.44 for Souter, and 1.45 for Stevens. Four other Justices defined at least five words
in their majority opinions. The mean number of dictionary references per word were 1.71 for
Alito, 1.00 for Blackmun, 1.71 for Rehnquist, and 1.00 for Roberts.
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2. Which Dictionaries? 
We have discussed the distinction between general and legal
dictionaries.157 Some dictionaries fall into a third category, techni-
cal, in that they address a specialized field such as medicine or
accounting. General dictionaries were used most often in the
majority opinions, 74 percent of the time; legal dictionaries were
cited 45 percent of the time; and technical dictionaries were used in
only 6 percent of the cases. 
Twenty-one percent of the opinions cited both a general dictionary
and a legal dictionary, 53 percent a general dictionary but not a
legal dictionary, and 24 percent a legal dictionary but not a general
dictionary.158 We might expect the Justices to rely on general
dictionaries for non-legal terms and legal dictionaries for words that
are specific to the legal system. But as described earlier, examina-
tion of opinions indicates that there is no consistent practice in the
Justices’ choices between these two types of dictionaries.159 The
substantial proportion of opinions in which Justices cited both
general and legal dictionaries underscores the absence of a clear
distinction between the two.
The Justices cited a wide range of general and legal dictionaries,
but a few stand out for the frequency with which they are used.
Among general dictionaries, four predominated: Webster’s Third
(cited in 36 percent of the opinions), the Oxford English Dictionary
(20 percent), Webster’s Second (19 percent), and the American
Heritage (15 percent). Black’s dominates the legal dictionaries, with
citations in all but two of the opinions that cited any dictionary in
that category.
157. See supra Part II.B.2.
158. The other 2 percent cited neither type, using only a technical dictionary. In the types
of dictionaries and specific dictionaries used, there were generally only small differences
across the three fields of law. However, there were substantial and statistically significant
differences in the frequency with which general dictionaries were cited in opinions: 52 percent
in business and commercial law, 73 percent in labor and employment law, and 84 percent in
criminal law. In addition, the Justices cited both general and legal dictionaries in 27 percent
of the criminal law cases, a rate considerably higher than those for labor and employment law
(17 percent) and business and commercial law (14 percent). There also were large differences
in citations to Webster’s Third: 14 percent in business and commercial, 29 percent in labor
and employment, and 49 percent in criminal. 
159. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
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Not surprisingly, Justices differed in their use of particular
dictionaries. Most striking were preferences between the second and
third editions of Webster’s. Justice Scalia cited Webster’s Second in
nine of his majority opinions, constituting 56 percent of all the
opinions in which he cited dictionaries and more than four times the
rate of other Justices. Scalia cited Webster’s Third only twice, a rate
(12.5 percent) less than one-third that of other Justices.160 In
contrast, Justice O’Connor cited Webster’s Third in seven of her
opinions, 54 percent of her total, but she cited Webster’s Second only
twice.161 Justices also differed widely in their use of Black’s, with
Thomas employing it 73 percent of the time and Scalia doing so only
19 percent of the time.162 Because Black’s was the dominant
dictionary in the legal category, similar differences existed for legal
dictionaries as a whole.163
As we have noted,164 the line between descriptive and prescriptive
dictionaries is not nearly as clear as it is sometimes portrayed. But
to the extent that the Justices perceive differences between the two,
the balance between them merits consideration. Among the general
dictionaries, the American Heritage and Webster’s Second stand out
for their reputation as prescriptive.165 Altogether, 30 percent of all
citations to general dictionaries in majority opinions were to the two
prescriptive dictionaries. But the Justices differed in the shares of
their citations that went to the dictionaries labeled as prescriptive.
160. The other Justices collectively cited Webster’s Second 12.9 percent of the time and
Webster’s Third 39.6 percent of the time. The differences between Scalia and all the other
Justices were statistically significant for both Webster’s Second (X2=17.02, p<.001) and
Webster’s Third (X2=4.41, p=.036).
161. The differences between O’Connor and all the other Justices for the two dictionaries
were not close to achieving statistical significance. Thus it is Scalia who stands out as
distinctive in his use of these dictionaries.
162. The differences among the Justices in the use of Black’s were statistically significant
(X2=27.39, p=.037). In addition to the three Justices cited in the text, two other Justices cited
a dictionary more than five times in majority opinions and used a single dictionary in half or
more of their majority opinions: Justice Ginsburg used Black’s in four of six opinions and
Justice Stevens used Black’s in five of eight opinions. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Webster’s
Third in all four opinions in which he cited dictionaries.
163. Justice Thomas ranked highest among Justices with a substantial number of opinions
that cited dictionaries, with 80 percent of his opinions citing legal dictionaries; for Justice
Scalia, the proportion was 19 percent, the same as his proportion of opinions citing Black’s
alone.
164. See supra Part II.B.1.
165. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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Among the Justices who wrote more than five majority opinions,
those shares ranged from 65 percent for Scalia to 15 percent for
O’Connor.166 To the extent that Justices responded to the reputa-
tions of dictionaries as prescriptive or descriptive, their preferences
between the two varied considerably.
Although these differences among the Justices are of interest,
ultimately they are less important than the eclecticism that
characterizes nearly all the Justices. None of the Justices who cited
dictionaries in a substantial number of opinions consistently relied
on a single dictionary. Justice Thomas’s 73 percent usage rate for
Black’s is noteworthy, especially because there are some words for
which Black’s has only limited relevance. But even Thomas was
varied in his choices among general dictionaries. And no other
Justice with a substantial number of opinions citing dictionaries
came close to his high proportionate use of a single dictionary. This
varied and selective usage pattern indicates that Justices employ
particular dictionaries whose definitions they find useful in a
particular case rather than binding themselves to the definitions of
a single dictionary.167
166. Among Justices with more than five majority opinions citing dictionaries, the other
proportions were 19 percent for Breyer, 33 percent for Ginsburg, 29 percent for Kennedy, 50
percent for Souter, 25 percent for Stevens, and 35 percent for Thomas.
167. If we include concurring and dissenting opinions, we find the same basic patterns of
usage by individual Justices. One noteworthy change resulted from Justice Scalia’s heavy use
of Webster’s Second in his minority opinions: his overall rate of usage for that dictionary
increased to 63 percent. Justice Scalia’s citations in two cases illustrate the varied and highly
selective usage patterns of the Justices. Scalia authored the majority opinions in United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008), and United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008),
criminal cases in which the decisions were announced two weeks apart. Scalia used the
American Heritage Dictionary to help define the statutory term “promotes” in Williams, see
553 U.S. at 294-95; in contrast, he cited Webster’s Second to help define the statutory term
“promote” in Santos, see 553 U.S. at 517-18. In both cases, one or more briefs for the parties
cited dictionary definitions of “promote,” but none of those citations were to the American
Heritage Dictionary or to Webster’s Second. See Brief for the United States at 27-28, United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (No. 06-494) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961) and RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1548 (2d ed. 1987)); Brief for Respondent Benedicto Diaz at 16, United States v.
Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (No. 06-1005) (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d. ed 1989));
Reply Brief for the United States at 7, United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (No. 06-1005)
(citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1548 (2d ed. 1987)).
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3. Briefs and Opinions
As with other resources for interpretation of statutes, the Justices
often receive inputs from the litigants in the form of dictionary
definitions of statutory terms. To probe the relationship between
those inputs and the definitions that Justices ultimately cite in their
opinions, we analyzed a sample of sixteen of the 117 cases in our
study.168 For each case, we compared the words defined and the
dictionaries cited in briefs for the parties and for the United States
as an amicus, when the Federal Government participated in that
role, with the dictionaries cited in the Court’s opinion. We treated
two dictionaries as the same if they were labeled as the same edition
even if they were published at different times.
We found only a limited match between the use of dictionaries in
the briefs and their use in the Court’s opinion. Of the thirty-six
words for which a dictionary was used in either a brief or a majority
opinion,169 only thirteen (36 percent) were defined with a dictionary
in both the brief and the opinion. The disjunction ran in both
directions. Among the thirty-one words with dictionary citations in
a brief, only thirteen (42 percent) had dictionary citations in the
Court’s opinion; among the eighteen words with dictionary citations
in the opinion, five (28 percent) did not have such citations in a
brief.
When a dictionary definition was used for the same word in the
Court opinion and one or more briefs, the specific dictionaries can
be compared. Of the thirteen words in question, the opinion had at
least one dictionary in common with the briefs for ten. But for eight
168. We selected a sample that was designed to be representative of all cases in the set of
117 in terms of the mix of cases by field. We also made sure to include at least one Rehnquist
Court and one Roberts Court decision in each field, and we overrepresented Roberts Court
decisions (ten of the sixteen cases) to ensure that we were capturing current practices of the
Justices well.
169. We counted a word (“willful”) and a related phrase (“knowingly and willfully”) in
different briefs in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) as a single word.
“Willful” was defined in the Brief for Respondent at 18, Safeco Ins. Co., 551 U.S. 47 (No. 06-
84); “knowingly and willfully” was defined in the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 15, Safeco Ins. Co., 551 U.S. 47 (No. 06-84). To avoid skewing the
results, in United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) we counted as one word a set of four
parallel words (“advertise,” “present,” “distribute,” and “solicit”) that were cited in the Brief
for the United States, supra note 167, at 27.
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of the words, the opinion cited a dictionary that was mentioned in
none of the briefs. And for all but one of the words, a brief cited a
dictionary that the opinion did not. For only one of the thirteen
words was there a full match between briefs and opinion, with each
citing the same single dictionary.
We would not expect the use of dictionaries in the briefs and their
use in the Court’s opinion to be exactly the same in all cases any
more than we would expect that with other interpretive resources.
Still, the wide divergence between the two in the words defined and
the dictionaries used to define them is striking. Like other evidence
we have discussed, this divergence suggests that both the decision
whether to employ dictionaries to help define a particular word and
the choice of dictionaries to cite are primarily case-specific rather
than the result of systematic judgments.170
4. Date of Publication
As we have discussed, Justices might have preferences for
dictionaries published near the time at which a statute was enacted
or the time when the controversy before the Court was initiated.171
In turn, those preferences might reflect the Justices’ broader
approaches to statutory interpretation.
We probed these preferences by identifying the years in which
dictionaries were published, statutes were enacted, and Supreme
Court cases were initially filed in court. If the publication date was
within six years of enactment, we counted the dictionary as
170. This inquiry understates the divergence between briefs and the Court’s opinions,
because it is limited to cases in which the opinion cites at least one dictionary. We examined
a small sample of a dozen cases out of the more than 500 in which the majority opinion did
not cite a dictionary; we did so by drawing two cases randomly from each subject matter field
in the Rehnquist Court and in the Roberts Court. In three of the twelve cases, or 25 percent,
the briefs cited at least one dictionary definition. In one of those cases, Howard Delivery
Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2006), the petitioner’s and
respondent’s brief each cited multiple dictionaries and used those dictionaries to define
multiple terms. See Brief for Petitioners at 11-13, Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. 547 U.S. 651
(No. 05-128); Brief for Respondent at 19, 21, 26, Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. 547 U.S. 651 (No.
05-128). Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion joined the two briefs in citing the definition of
“contribution” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. But Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion for the Court cited neither this nor any other dictionary definition.
171. See supra Part II.B.3.
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proximate to enactment.172 We used the same six-year rule for the
time of initiation for the controversy, which we defined as the year
that the case that ultimately came before the Court was filed. If any
dictionary cited in an opinion was contemporaneous in terms of
enactment date, the opinion was treated as citing an enactment-
date dictionary; again, we used the same approach with respect to
filing date.
For the Court as a whole, 40 percent of the majority opinions
included at least one citation to a dictionary published near the time
of enactment, and 45 percent included a citation to a dictionary
published near the time the case was filed. Altogether, 11 percent
of the opinions used dictionaries that met both of those criteria,173
and 26 percent did not use a dictionary that met either criterion.174
As important as the pattern for the entire Court are the practices
of individual Justices. The Justices differed to some extent, but all
the Justices who used dictionaries in a substantial number of
majority opinions were eclectic. Table 4 shows the distribution of
practices among Justices who cited dictionaries in ten or more
opinions.
172. If the words being interpreted were enacted as an amendment to an earlier statute,
such as the 1991 Civil Rights Act amending Title VII, we used the date of the amendment. For
the few statutes enacted in the nineteenth century, we relaxed the six-year rule and counted
dictionaries published in the same general era as contemporaneous.
173. An opinion could meet both criteria if a single dictionary did so or if the two criteria
were met by different dictionaries.
174. There were small differences among the three fields of law in the frequency with
which dictionaries close to the times of enactment and filing were used. There was a much
bigger difference between criminal law and the other fields of law in the frequency with which
no dictionary with either attribute was used. In 36 percent of the criminal cases, the majority
opinion cited no dictionary that was published close to the enactment time or to the filing
time. The proportions for business and commercial law and labor and employment law were
14 percent and 17 percent, respectively.
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Table 4. Use of Dictionaries According to Time of 
Enactment and Time of Filing by Justices with Ten or
More Majority Opinions Citing Dictionaries, in 
Percentages175
Justice
Close to
enactment date
Close to
filing date Both Neither
# of
opinions
Breyer  15.4  38.5  0.0  46.2  13
O’Connor  46.2  30.8  7.7  30.8  13
Scalia  31.2  68.8 12.5  12.5  16
Souter  53.8  38.5   7.7  15.4  13
Thomas  46.7  40.0   0.0  13.3  15
Justice Scalia used dictionaries from close to the filing date more
than two-thirds of the time, and Justice Souter used dictionaries
from close to the enactment date more than half the time. But, with
the possible exception of Scalia,176 no Justice had a predominant
practice, and all five Justices wrote multiple opinions with no
definitions from dictionaries that were close to either the enactment
or filing date.
C. Implications
We have discussed a number of patterns in the Justices’ choices
whether to cite dictionary definitions of words in statutes, and in
the more specific choices they make in cases in which they do cite
dictionaries. One aspect of those general patterns involves what we
found in comparing the three fields of law.
Although patterns of dictionary usage were mostly similar for the
three fields, there were some notable differences, and it was
generally opinions in criminal cases that diverged from the two
other fields. The proportion of majority opinions citing dictionaries
was distinctly higher in criminal law, overall and increasingly so
175. Opinions are listed as close to filing date or enactment date if any dictionary cited in
the opinion meets that criterion. The “both” column includes opinions from the “close to
enactment” and “close to filing” columns, so percentages do not add up to 100 percent if there
were any cases in the “both” category.
176. Scalia’s proportion of opinions citing dictionaries published close to the filing time was
lower in his separate opinions, bringing the total proportion down to 63 percent.
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over our three periods. In the cases that cited dictionaries, the
average number of words for which dictionaries were used was
highest in criminal law. The Justices also cited general dictionaries
more frequently in criminal cases than in business and commercial
or labor and employment cases. 
As we discuss in Part IV.A, these attributes can be understood in
part to reflect the Justices’ recognition of the personal stakes
involved in criminal cases and the lack of sophisticated knowledge
on the part of individuals who become criminal defendants. Yet
when they cite dictionaries in their majority opinions, the Justices
are a little less likely to use dictionaries published close to the time
that a case was filed in criminal law than in the other fields, and
they are distinctly more likely in criminal law opinions to cite no
dictionaries that were contemporaneous with either the enactment
of a statute or the filing of a case.177 
Across the three fields of law, our data add to the evidence from
other studies178 that the Justices increasingly cite definitions of
statutory language in their opinions. Some Justices are more likely
to use dictionaries than others, but there has been a general
movement toward dictionary use, so that the Justices differ less in
their frequency of dictionary citation in the Roberts Court than they
did in the two eras of the Rehnquist Court that we have analyzed.
Nor do differences in Justices’ frequency of dictionary use show an
ideological division. This pattern is very different from the increas-
ing divergence among the Justices in the use of legislative history,
a divergence that falls largely along ideological lines.179
At the same time, our analysis of opinions that cite dictionaries
paints a picture of dictionary use that is more casual and arbitrary
177. The proportions of dictionaries close to case filing were 42 percent in criminal law, 44
percent in labor and employment law, and 57 percent in business and commercial law. The
proportions on dictionaries that were not close to either enactment or filing dates were 36
percent in criminal law, 17 percent in labor and employment law, and 14 percent in business
and commercial law.
178. See generally Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress, supra note 3;
Thumma & Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress, supra note 3.
179. That divergence is documented for labor and employment law in Brudney & Ditslear,
supra note 146, at 223, 226-27. The coefficient of variability among the Justices in the
frequency with which they cited legislative history in majority opinions was .31 in the Burger
Court and .55 in the Rehnquist Court. See id. at 223, for data from which these figures were
calculated.
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than principled or systematic. To begin with, even in an era in
which dictionary use has become quite common in statutory
interpretation cases, Justices often do not cite dictionaries in their
opinions for the Court. In most of these cases, there likely were one
or more terms for which dictionary definitions might well have been
relevant. Moreover, in cases in which the Justices do cite dictionary
definitions for one or more terms, we found that briefs for the
parties and for the federal government as amicus frequently used
the dictionary to define terms for which the Court’s opinion did not
cite a dictionary.180 This limited overlap between the words for
which dictionaries were invoked in the briefs and the words cited to
dictionaries in the majority opinion underscores the arbitrariness of
the Court’s dictionary use.
Perhaps more telling, the Justices also seem to be casual and
arbitrary when they do turn to dictionaries to define statutory
language. They nearly always use a small number of dictionaries to
ascertain the meaning of that term—typically, one or two. Their
choices of dictionaries differ from case to case; they frequently
substitute their own choices for those cited in briefs to define the
same terms; and they do not adopt consistent practices in aligning
the publication dates of the dictionaries they cite either with the
dates of statutory enactment or with the dates on which the cases
before them were filed.
The combination of the small number of dictionaries typically
employed to define a word and the absence of a consistent practice
in selecting those dictionaries is striking. The Justices’ choices in
citing dictionary definitions seem to be largely ad hoc, based on the
appeal of particular dictionaries in particular cases.181 Such ad hoc
180. Altogether, in the sample of cases with majority opinions citing dictionary definitions
that we examine, only 42 percent of the words with dictionary definitions in a brief had
dictionary definitions in Court opinions that cited to a dictionary. See supra Part III.B.3. As
we have noted, some of the cases in which the Court cites no dictionary definitions have briefs
that do cite definitions. If those cases were taken into account, the proportion would be even
lower than 42 percent. See supra note 170.
181. To go beyond our findings, the Justices also may be engaging in ad hoc practices when
they choose particular definitions from a dictionary. As discussed in Part II.B, in the
dictionaries that the Justices use most often, the order of definitions does not provide a basis
for selection. For words that have several different definitions, some may be excludable
because they clearly do not apply to the context in which a statutory word is used. But the
Justices still have a wide range of choice that is effectively unconstrained. See, for example,
538 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:483
usage strongly suggests that definitions are being invoked in
support of Justices’ pre-existing conceptions of reasonable meanings
for words rather than serving as independent guides to judgment
about those meanings.
To return to a metaphor that we employed earlier,182 the image of
legislative history that has been ascribed to Judge Harold Leventhal
seems to apply powerfully to dictionary usage. As reported by
Justice Scalia, Leventhal spoke of “use of legislative history as the
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the
heads of the guests for one’s friends.”183 Leventhal was underlining
the selectivity that can take place in choices of legislative history
materials to support a judge’s preferred interpretation of a statute.
One of us has argued that the existence of a hierarchy of legisla-
tive history sources, tied to the structure of congressional law
making and long recognized in Supreme Court opinions, operates as
a constraint on judicial selectivity.184 But insofar as legislative
history is susceptible to selective use, dictionaries seem considerably
more susceptible. The Justices could use certain guidelines to
reduce the element of arbitrariness in their reliance on dictionaries.
For instance, they could adopt the consistent approach of reporting
a wide range of relevant dictionary definitions for whatever terms
are at issue in a case. They also could develop standards for when
to rely on a general dictionary as opposed to a legal dictionary, or on
a dictionary edition close to date of enactment as opposed to date of
case filing. As we have documented, however, the Justices’ actual
practices diverge fundamentally from any such approaches.
In sum, what our findings suggest is that the powerful movement
toward citation of dictionary definitions in the Court’s opinions
represents primarily a change in rhetoric. The Justices as a group
have become increasingly prone to employ dictionaries in the
process of defending their interpretations of terms whose meaning
our discussion of the Court’s choice of definition in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), in Part IV.D.
182. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the cocktail party effect).
183. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
again invoked the Leventhal quip in his book. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 377.
184. See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch
Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1225-27 (2010); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note
7, at 146-60; see also infra text accompanying notes 338-41 for further discussion of this issue.
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is contested. But our evidence about their citation practices
indicates that the Justices generally do not allow dictionary
definitions to constrain them as they work toward their independ-
ently preferred conclusions.
Our quantitative data provide one perspective on the Justices’ use
of dictionaries in their opinions. To explore further the ways that
the Justices utilize dictionaries, we need to analyze in closer,
qualitative terms the opinions in which dictionaries are cited.
IV. A SEGMENTED AND SUBJECTIVE DICTIONARY CULTURE
Our results reveal the growth over twenty-five years of a
pervasive dictionary culture at the Court, one that extends to both
liberal and conservative Justices, to purposivists as well as textual-
ists. There is no obvious ideological dimension to the Court’s
dictionary usage, perhaps because dictionary definitions seem to
lack the intrinsic association often present between canons and
conservative values or between legislative history and remedial
purposes. At the same time, the Justices’ strikingly subjective and
standardless dictionary practices indicate that what is at stake
doctrinally is more than a straightforward search for ordinary
meaning.
In our view, it is helpful to consider the Court’s approach to
dictionaries from a functional perspective. Specifically, we believe
the Court invokes dictionary definitions to serve four distinct
functions. One is subject-specific, involving the high degree of use
in criminal law majority opinions. The other three are more
generally applicable, reflecting distinct roles that dictionaries play
as part of the Court’s overall interpretive methodology.185
We begin by examining briefly two decisions in the criminal law
area, in which dictionary usage is greatest. These cases illustrate a
notice function that the Court has effectively associated with
dictionaries in its criminal law decisions.
185. We develop these four distinct functions based on a close examination of seventeen
majority opinions. Overall, we reviewed fifty of our 117 majority opinions for purposes of
functional categorization. See infra notes 273, 345, and 346 for further discussion of our
process.
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We then turn to a more detailed analysis of decisions illustrating
how the Court’s dictionary usage serves three broad instrumental
functions from an interpretive standpoint. One function is as a way
station. The majority examines dictionary meanings but finds them
to be unhelpful and turns elsewhere to justify its holding. This
bypassing of the dictionary resource may occur because definitions
are deemed insufficiently determinate, or because other interpretive
resources trump the definitional approach.
A second function served by dictionaries is as an ornament. The
majority describes dictionary meanings as helpful, but they play
only a minor role in justifying the result reached. The majority
relies primarily on other interpretive assets including at times its
separate construction of ordinary meaning but more often larger
contextual resources such as legislative history or purpose, canons,
precedent, practical consequences, and agency deference. Dictionary
definitions are invoked as pointing in the same direction and they
enhance the authoritative tone of the decision, but they are at most
reinforcing and often simply decorative.
The third function served by dictionary usage is as a barrier. The
majority determines that the dictionary definition is virtually
dispositive and therefore justifies discounting or ignoring larger
contextual factors. In a series of decisions, the Court relies on
dictionaries to preclude or override probative evidence of congressio-
nal intent, executive branch understanding, and/or judicial prece-
dent. 
After examining cases involving these three functions, we offer
thoughts on the role played by dictionaries in general, including the
troubling implications of the Court’s new dictionary culture. We
recognize that, as is true with respect to legislative history, canons,
or judicial precedent, the Court’s use of dictionaries may be
challenged as prone to selective application or cherry-picking. But
we explain how dictionary usage has assumed a normative dimen-
sion that differs in important respects from the application of these
other interpretive resources, and why this normative dimension
makes the Court’s instrumental and subjective use of dictionary
definitions especially disturbing.
2013] OASIS OR MIRAGE 541
A. The Dictionary and Criminal Law Cases
As described in Part III, dictionary use is significantly greater in
the criminal law field than in commercial or labor law.186 Dictionary
usage in criminal law majority opinions ranked highest in all three
periods, and in the Roberts Court the justices have used dictionaries
in close to 40 percent of their majorities in these cases. Further,
when using dictionaries the Justices define more words per opinion
in criminal law cases than in the other two fields. They also use
general dictionaries significantly more in criminal law majority
opinions than in labor law and commercial law majorities, and they
use both general and legal dictionaries together far more often in
criminal majorities than in the two other fields.187
We believe a range of factors likely contributes to the Court’s
special level of dictionary interest in the criminal law area. Criminal
statutes may use more common everyday language than their civil
law counterparts, inviting relatively greater emphasis on ordinary
meaning analysis. Relatedly, criminal statutes tend to affect a less
educated population than laws regulating employers and businesses
in general. And because the cohort of potential criminals is less
likely to receive legal counsel about how to comply with statutory
prohibitions, the unfiltered ordinary meaning of text may assume
greater importance.
In addition, the consequence of violating a federal criminal
statute is typically imprisonment as opposed to injunctive relief or
monetary damages.188 The severity of this consequence has given
rise to special concerns and sensitivities in our legal system, from
a higher burden of proof and the right to a jury trial to rule of lenity
protections against vaguely worded penal prohibitions. The Court’s
robust appetite for dictionaries in the criminal law area probably
reflects to some degree the Justices’ sense that defendants should
have sufficiently clear notice and understanding of offenses the
186. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
187. See supra Part III.A.
188. See generally William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2027 &
n.272 (2008) (discussing how broad federal liability rules and severe federal sentences
increase the number of incarcerated persons in state prisons). 
542 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:483
government claims they have committed. We briefly describe two
decisions in our dataset that illustrate this perspective.
In Bailey v. United States, the Court had to decide whether
carrying a firearm in a bag in a locked car trunk was sufficient
evidence of proximity and accessibility to support a conviction for
“use” of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
offense.189 The Court decided it was not, relying in part on dictionary
definitions of “use” that require active employment of the object
used.190 In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that by
ascribing an active-employment meaning to “use” it was restricting
the government’s ability to prosecute under the statutory
provision.191
In Abuelhawa v. United States, the issue was whether a person
who used his cell phone to arrange for a misdemeanor drug
purchase also committed a separate felony by “facilitating” the
distributor’s drug sales.192 The Court recognized that the plain
meaning of “facilitate” encompassed the defendant’s phone calls
inasmuch as the calls made distribution of the drugs easier.193
Instead the Court reasoned that the word as used in this statute did
“not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.”194 The
Court relied in this context on a legal dictionary definition of
facilitating a crime as synonymous with aiding or abetting its
commission, and it determined that a misdemeanant pur-
chaser—although a necessary participant to the drug sales—was
not a facilitator in this more active sense.195 
We do not mean to suggest that the Justices’ use of dictionaries
in criminal cases is necessarily justified in normative terms. It may
be, for instance, that examples of how “use” or “facilitate” are
regularly employed in everyday sentences would provide a more
189. See 516 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)), superseded by statute,
Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in Abbott v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010).
190. See id. at 145 (relying on definitions from two dictionaries).
191. See id. at 150.
192. 556 U.S. 816, 818 (2009) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2006)).
193. See id. at 819.
194. Id. at 820 (citation omitted).
195. See id. at 820-21 (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “aid and abet” and
“facilitation”).
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reliable indicator as to ordinary meaning.196 We also do not mean to
suggest that the Court’s dictionary usage in criminal cases is
predominantly pro-defendant. There are numerous instances where
the Court invokes dictionary definitions to help establish that the
contested criminal statutory provision does cover the defendant’s
conduct.197 Our point is rather that the Court’s especially frequent
use of dictionaries in the criminal law field reflects to a considerable
extent an interest in assuring that defendants—and citizens more
generally—have been given adequately clear notice of what conduct
can lead to federal criminal prosecution.
B. The Dictionary as a Way Station
In United States v. Santos, the Court construed the principal
federal money-laundering statute, which makes it a crime to engage
in financial transactions using the “proceeds” of certain unlawful
activities with a specified intent.198 Writing for a four-member
plurality,199 Justice Scalia concluded that the term “proceeds”
referred not to the expansive concept of “receipts” generated by the
unlawful activities, but rather to the narrower idea of “profits,” that
is, gross receipts less expenses.200 Although the Court was closely
divided as to the meaning of “proceeds,” there was agreement that
dictionary definitions were of no assistance in resolving the issue.
Justice Scalia began his analysis by noting that the statute does
not define “proceeds”; he then cited three dictionaries for the
proposition that in ordinary usage terms “proceeds” has long been
understood to mean either receipts or profits.201 Scalia proceeded to
196. See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.)
(relying on examples from Google search and illustrative usage to determine ordinary
meaning of “harboring” an undocumented alien under criminal statute).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294-95 (2008); James v. United
States, 550 U.S. 192, 207-08, 213-14 (2007); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127-28,
130-31 (1998); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 227-29 (1993).
198. 553 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2008); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2006).
199. Joining Justice Scalia’s opinion were Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Thomas; Justice
Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice Alito’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy and Breyer; Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Santos, 553 U.S. at 509, 524, 529, 531.
200. See id. at 511-14.
201. Id. at 511 (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 544 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1542 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL
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examine the word’s use in multiple provisions of the federal money-
laundering statute and concluded that its meaning remained
entirely ambiguous.202 Accordingly, he invoked the rule of lenity to
construe the term narrowly in favor of the defendant.203 Justice
Alito, dissenting for four members of the Court, agreed that
dictionaries did little or nothing to resolve the meaning of “pro-
ceeds.”204 He then relied on other contextual resources to argue that
the word as enacted meant gross receipts.205
Dictionaries received relatively short shrift from Justices Scalia
and Alito as their opinions turned to more complex and multi-
layered treatment of how to interpret a key contested term in its
larger statutory setting.206 Each opinion consulted more than one
general dictionary definition for the word “proceeds.” But each was
candid enough to recognize that the dictionary added no value in
this instance and that only other interpretive resources would
enable the Court to reach a result. 
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Court had to decide whether
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects former employees as
well as current ones.207 The statute prohibits retaliatory discrimina-
tion by an employer against “any of his employees or applicants for
employment.”208 The court of appeals had held that “employees”
refers to current and not former employees,209 but the Supreme
Court reversed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas.
The Court first determined that the term “employees” was
ambiguous with respect to excluding former employees. Justice
Thomas reasoned that neither the Title VII definition of “employee”
nor treatment of the term in Black’s Law Dictionary included a clear
DICTIONARY 1972 (2d ed. 1954)).
202. Id. at 511-14.
203. Id. at 514.
204. Id. at 532.
205. See id. at 533-46 (invoking meaning of “proceeds” in international money-laundering
treaty, model money-laundering act, and multiple state money-laundering statutes, as well
as legislative history and purposive considerations from Congress).
206. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, did not discuss dictionary definitions at
all; he relied principally on legislative history and policy arguments. Id. at 524-28.
207. 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
209. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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temporal qualifier.210 After noting the statutory definition of
“employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” Thomas
quoted from the legal dictionary definition of “employed” as
“performing work under an employer-employee relationship.”211 But
he dismissed this definition as unhelpful because the statutory term
“employed” could as easily be read to mean “was employed” as “is
employed.”212 The Court then relied at length on larger structural
and purposive arguments, emphasizing that Title VII uses “employ-
ees” to include former employees in numerous other provisions and
also that authorizing the prospect of post-employment retaliation
would deter victims of discrimination from complaining about
unlawful employer conduct.213 
In both Santos and Robinson, the Court quickly sidestepped
dictionary definitions because it found them to be inconclusive.214
The Court also has treated dictionaries as an afterthought to its
interpretive analysis. In Watson v. United States, the Court held
that a person who trades his drugs for a gun does not “use” a
firearm “during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime” so as
to qualify for a mandatory minimum sentence.215 Writing for eight
members of the Court, Justice Souter observed that absent any
statutory definition of the verb “use” its meaning “has to turn on the
language as we normally speak it.”216 He then proceeded to rely on
analogies from everyday life to reason that no ordinary person
would understand receiving an object in a barter transaction as
tantamount to “using” that object.217 This common sense introspec-
tive approach to discovering ordinary meaning was fairly typical of
the Court’s reasoning prior to 1986.218 In a short footnote, Justice
210. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342.
211. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th
ed. 1990)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 342-46.
214. See also TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 32 (2001) (sidestepping a dictionary
argument on meaning of when liability “arises” under Fair Credit Reporting Act because
dictionary definitions of “arise” are ambiguous).
215. 552 U.S. 74, 76 (2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006)).
216. Id. at 79.
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1978);
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-74 (1978); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81
(1975). See generally SOLAN, supra note 100, at 74-75.
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Souter added that “dictionaries confirm this conclusion” because
even the expansive standard definitions of “use” do not stretch this
far.219
Finally, the Court has discounted dictionary definitions when
they are overcome by sufficiently clear evidence that Congress
meant to depart from a dictionary’s definitional priorities. In
Johnson v. United States, the Court held that a provision of the
1984 Sentencing Reform Act authorizing a district court to “revoke”
a term of supervised release in favor of reimprisonment impliedly
permitted the lower court to require service of a further term of
supervised release following the added incarceration.220 Writing for
seven members of the Court,221 Justice Souter acknowledged that
the primary dictionary meaning of “revoke” is “to annul by recalling
or taking back.”222 He concluded, however, that Congress meant to
use “revoke” in an unconventional sense, as “allowing a ‘revoked’
term of supervised release to retain vitality after revocation.”223
Justice Souter based his conclusion on the overall structure and
purpose of the supervised release provision. In different paragraphs
of the text, Congress authorized district courts to “terminate”
supervised release under certain conditions and to “revoke” it under
others, suggesting Congress did not intend that the sense of finality
219. Watson, 552 U.S. at 79 n.7. The Court in Watson had to navigate around its earlier
decision in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993), holding that a person who trades
his gun for drugs is “using” a firearm under the mandatory minimum sentencing provision.
See Smith, 508 U.S. at 241. Justice Souter’s footnote essentially sought to reconcile Smith and
Watson while alluding to Justice Scalia’s dissenting position in Smith that the dictionary
definition of “use” is so elastic as to be unhelpful. See Watson, 552 U.S. at 79 n.7. Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Watson argues that the two decisions cannot coexist; she would
interpret “use a firearm” in this statute to mean use for its intended purpose as a weapon. See
id. at 84 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For another example in our dataset of the Court’s quick
reference to the dictionary to confirm its own ordinary meaning analysis, see Heintz v.
Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995).
220. See 529 U.S. 694, 703-07 (2000) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006)). The Court
in Johnson also addressed allegations that a different subsection of the law violated
defendant’s rights under the ex post facto clause; that portion of the majority opinion does not
involve dictionary usage. See id. at 699.
221. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment and Justice Scalia dissented. Justice
Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence that joined the majority opinion in relevant part. See
id. at 713-15.
222. Id. at 704 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1944 (1981)).
223. Id. at 707.
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attached to the former verb was necessarily present for “revoke.”224
Further, because the reimprisonment that accompanied a revocation
of supervised release was, in effect, a continuation of the terms of
supervision, the majority reasoned that the balance of this super-
vised reimprisonment could remain effective as a term of supervised
release.225 Souter recognized that the Court was construing “revoke”
as meaning “to call or summon back” in a provisional or tentative
sense rather than the final or rescinding sense that was prototypical
in the dictionary.226 But having concluded that this unconventional
sense departed from the ordinary meaning of the statute’s key
contested word, Souter insisted that “this is exactly what ought to
happen when ... the realization of clear congressional policy (here,
favoring the ability to impose supervised release) is in tension with
the result that customary interpretive rules would deliver.”227 
In Johnson, the Court’s bypass of dictionary-defined ordinary
meaning was due to the inapposite rather than the inconclusive
nature of the dictionary approach.228 Under either rationale, the
Court was candid about the limited role for dictionary definitions,
but Johnson was unusual in explicitly subordinating ordinary
meaning to congressional purpose.
One might ask why the Court consults dictionaries at all in this
way station category of cases, as it does not routinely invoke canons,
precedent, or legislative history when those resources are not
deemed supportive of its final result. The Justices may well be
responding to dictionary-based positions advanced by the parties,
although even there the Court does not address every losing
argument. A more plausible response may be the extent to which
224. See id. at 704-05.
225. See id. at 705-06.
226. Id. at 706 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1944 (1981)).
227. Id. at 706 n.9. Justice Scalia vigorously dissented, arguing that the meaning of
“revoke” ascribed by the majority was not just unconventional but fictitious. See id. at 716-17
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. The Court pursued a comparable bypass in Mayo Foundation v. United States,
involving whether medical residents are properly viewed as employees or as “students”
exempted from FICA taxes by Congress. 131 S. Ct. 704, 708 (2011). Chief Justice Roberts for
a unanimous Court acknowledged petitioner’s argument that the standard dictionary
definition of “student” encompasses medical residents, but then looked both to other sections
of the tax code that excluded medical residents from certain exemptions available to
employees and to traditional notions of Chevron deference to rule for the IRS. Id. at 708, 711-
16. 
548 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:483
the Justices as a group have come to regard dictionaries as a
necessary intermediate element in their interpretive approach to
statutes.
C. The Dictionary as an Ornament
It is important to be clear about the contours of this category. In
the cases that follow, the Court credits dictionary usage as contrib-
uting to its result, and this assertion is technically accurate. At the
same time, the dictionary is neither a necessary nor a substantial
element in the Court’s reasoning; in most instances, it is of periph-
eral importance. Despite its typical location at the start of the
Court’s analysis, dictionary usage could be eliminated from these
majority opinions with no real diminution in their persuasive force.
At the same time, the dictionary’s presence at an early stage lends
a patina of objectivity and legitimacy based on its close relationship
to the disputed statutory text. Accordingly, we refer to dictionary
use here as ornamental.229 
In Mac’s Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co., the Court
had to decide whether substantial alterations in rental terms
imposed by a petroleum franchisor on its service-station franchisees
amounted to constructive termination under the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act (PMPA) when the franchisees continued to
operate despite the significant material changes.230 The appellate
court had held that a franchisee could recover for constructive
termination without abandoning its franchise.231 A unanimous
Supreme Court reversed.
229. We recognize that invoking dictionary definitions may provide an incrementally
supportive justification for the Court’s determination as to the meaning of the text. We use
the label “ornamental,” however, because the minimal substantive contribution made by
dictionary definitions is less salient than the legitimating role these definitions play when
they are deliberatively identified and assessed in objective terms near the start of the Court’s
analysis.
230. See 130 S. Ct. 1251, 1254-55 (2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006)). The PMPA
prohibits a franchisor from terminating a franchise except for specified reasons. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2802 (a)-(b) (2006).
231. See Marcoux v. Shell Oil Prod. Co., 524 F.3d 33, 45-47 (1st Cir. 2008), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 1251 (2010).
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Noting that the PMPA gave only an elliptical definition of the
word “termination,” Justice Alito turned first to the dictionary.232 As
the word “terminate” ordinarily means “put an end to,” the Court
reasoned that conduct is not prohibited under the Act’s plain
language unless it forces an end to the franchise.233 But having
made this point, the Court proceeded to provide four or five
additional grounds for its result.
Relying on the Uniform Commercial Code, Justice Alito noted
that the technical meaning of “terminating” a contract was well-
settled when Congress enacted the PMPA.234 He then explained how
requiring that franchisees abandon their franchises was consistent
with the doctrine of constructive termination in employment law—
constructive discharge—and landlord-tenant law—constructive
eviction.235 This in turn led to an examination of the legal term
“constructive.” The Court found that although the legal relationship
does end, it is the plaintiff rather than the defendant who effectu-
ates termination.236
The majority went on to impute awareness of the constructive
termination doctrine to the Congress that enacted the PMPA.237 In
addition, the majority described how Congress’s purpose in enacting
the statute was to federalize only the termination of franchise
relationships, leaving regulation of other franchisor-franchisee
disputes to their traditional domain under state law.238 Finally, the
Court concluded that it would be judicially unmanageable as a
practical matter to articulate a standard for when breaches of
contract were actionable under the PMPA even though the franchise
relationship endured.239 Viewed against this detailed reliance on
technical legal meaning, analogous common law doctrines, congres-
sional intent and purpose, and practical consequences, the Court’s
232. See 130 S. Ct. at 1257 (stating that under the PMPA “termination” includes
cancellation, but there is no further definition of terminate or cancel).
233. See id.
234. See id. at 1258.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 1259.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 1259-60.
239. See id. at 1260.
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use of a general dictionary definition seems little more than
window-dressing.
A similar pattern is evident in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia.240
The case involved whether the Lanham Act prohibited unaccredited
copying of a television series that was in the public domain after its
copyright had expired decades earlier.241 The statutory provision
before the Court created a federal remedy against a person who
makes a “false designation of origin [or] false or misleading
description of fact ... which ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the
origin ... of his or her goods.”242
Justice Scalia began by reviewing the dictionary definition of
“origin,” which he identified as “[t]he fact or process of coming into
being from a source.”243 In this instance, the “most natural” meaning
of source was the producer of the videotape being marketed as
“goods” by petitioner, Dastar, and it would be unnatural to extend
that meaning to encompass a person who may long ago have
originated the ideas or communications now embodied in the
videotape.244 He then demonstrated at length that any such
extension was incompatible with the purpose of the Lanham Act,
the larger structure of federal intellectual property law, and
Supreme Court precedent, as well as being unmanageable in
pragmatic terms.245
In doing so, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Act’s purpose—to
prohibit false or misleading designations likely to confuse consum-
ers as to the source of goods—did not apply to where a non-infring-
ing producer’s ideas came from because consumers typically do not
care about that question.246 Further, because patent and copyright
240. 539 U.S. 23, 24 (2003).
241. Id. at 3 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006)).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006). The Lanham Act largely regulates trademarks, but this
provision extends beyond trademark protection, addressing the violation known as “reverse
passing off”—where a producer represents someone else’s goods or services as his own. See
Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 27-29. It was undisputed that “origin” refers to origin of production
as well as geographic origin. See id. at 29-31.
243. Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 31 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1720-21 (2d ed. 1949)).
244. Id. at 31-32.
245. See id. at 32-37.
246. See id. at 32-33.
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law protect and also limit the rights of original creators of works,
extending trademark law to uncopyrighted works would impinge
upon areas Congress had traditionally reserved to those separate
fields of federal law.247 Finally, requiring attribution of uncopyright-
ed materials would pose serious practical problems for courts and
product manufacturers, and would conflict with several prior
Supreme Court decisions.248 Once again, although a dictionary
definition was used to launch the Court’s analysis, the core of the
Court’s reasoning involved other interpretive resources. 
Using the dictionary for essentially ornamental purposes is not
limited to unanimous opinions or to commercial law cases. In the
labor field, the Court in Crawford v. Nashville held that the
“opposition clause” of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protected
an employee who spoke out during an investigation into a co-
worker’s complaints of sexual harassment.249 Writing for seven
members of the Court, Justice Souter noted that the applicable
statutory text prohibits employer discrimination against any
employee “because he has opposed any practice made” unlawful by
the statute.250 Souter began by consulting two dictionaries to
determine that the verb “oppose” covers resisting and confronting
but also less active positions such as contending against and being
hostile or adverse to an opinion.251 Although the majority concluded
that some of these less energetic dictionary senses applied to an
employee’s communication to her employer about his discriminatory
conduct,252 it relied more extensively on numerous other factors.
These other grounds included an analysis of how “oppose” is used in
ordinary discourse to encompass reactive as well as proactive
conduct;253 a desire to avoid the absurd or “freakish” rule that an
employee is protected for reporting discrimination on her own but
247. See id. at 33-34.
248. See id. at 34-37.
249. 555 U.S. 271, 273 (2009).
250. Id. at 274 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)).
251. See id. at 276 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1957)
and RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1359 (2d ed. 1987)); Justice Alito
wrote separately concurring in the judgment, for himself and Justice Thomas. See id. at 276
(Alito, J., concurring).
252. See id. at 276.
253. See id. at 277.
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not in response to an employer question;254 a respect for the agency
guideline in this area;255 a concern that failing to protect responsive
opposition would chill employee reporting of violations thereby
frustrating congressional purpose;256 and an understanding that the
Court’s Title VII precedents supported its position.257
In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, an early Rehnquist era
decision, the Court held that a person of Arabian ancestry is
protected against racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.258
Justice White for the Court stated that the case hinged on the
understanding of “race” in 1870 when Congress enacted the law, not
in the present when a person of Arab ancestry is considered to be
within the Caucasian race.259 He began by consulting a series of
mid-nineteenth-century dictionaries and determined that they
described race in the narrower terms of ethnic groups.260 But the
Court ultimately relied on the legislative history and congressional
purpose accompanying this post-Civil War legislation. Justice White
noted that the congressional floor debates were replete with
references to Scandinavians, Anglo-Saxons, Mexicans, Gypsies and
Germans as “races,” and that legislators spoke of section 1981 as
meant to protect immigrant groups such as the Chinese and
French.261 “Based on” this evidence of legislative purpose, the Court
had “little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect
from discrimination ... persons ... because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics ... whether or not [this] would be classified as racial
in terms of modern scientific theory.”262
The Court in Saint Francis College used dictionaries from around
the time of enactment to help reframe the key interpretive issue in
254. See id. at 277-78.
255. See id. at 276 (quoting EEOC guideline).
256. See id. at 278.
257. See id. at 273-79 (relying on three decisions).
258. 481 U.S. 604 (1987). The statute, enacted in 1870, guaranteed to all persons “the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and the Court had
previously interpreted the provision as banning all “racial” discrimination in the making of
private contracts. See id. at 609.
259. See id. at 610.
260. See id. at 610-12 (consulting four dictionaries and also three encyclopedias published
between 1830 and 1887).
261. See id. at 612-13.
262. Id. at 613.
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historical rather than current terms.263 In this respect, reliance
might be viewed as more substantially supportive. Nonetheless,
because the majority was unusually explicit that its holding was
based simply on Congress’s clear understanding of the race-
discrimination protections it was enacting, the role of dictionaries
remained supplemental even if not marginal.
Finally, in Begay v. United States, the Court had to decide
whether the state felony offense of driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI) qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career
Criminals Act.264 The federal statutory provision defines a violent
felony as one that either has an element of physical force or “is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.”265 Writing for five members of the Court,
Justice Breyer held that the DUI offense did not qualify under this
provision.266 
Breyer began by relying on two language canons to reason that
the statute’s listed examples of violent felonies—burglary, arson,
extortion, or using explosives—illustrate and limit the kinds of
criminal conduct connoted by “otherwise.”267 Although driving under
the influence creates a risk of physical injury, it is not purposeful
and aggressive in the same way as the listed offenses.268 Breyer then
invoked the Act’s legislative history as further support, emphasizing
that Congress had rejected a proposal to include every offense
involving a substantial risk of physical force and opted instead for
the current examples.269 He also relied on the Armed Career
Criminal Act’s purpose, noting that Congress’s focus was on
263. See supra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
264. 553 U.S. 137, 139-40 (2008) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006)).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
266. Begay, 553 U.S. at 138, 148. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, while Justice
Alito dissented, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas. Id. at 138.
267. See id. at 142. Breyer does not name the canons, but he used (a) ejusdem generis,
reasoning that the general reference to “crimes present[ing] a serious potential risk of
physical injury” is limited to the same kind of crimes previously listed and (b) the rule against
surplusage, reasoning that if Congress had wanted the provision to cover every crime that
creates risk of physical injury it would not have needed to include any examples. Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
268. See id. at 144-45.
269. See id. at 143-44.
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augmenting punishment for a particular subset of offend-
ers—criminals with a record of aggressive and intentional crimes
rather than the strict liability offense of DUI.270 Breyer did invoke
the dictionary definition of “otherwise” in the midst of his discus-
sion, but only to establish that it was not inconsistent with the
majority’s analysis based on canons, legislative history, and
purpose.271
In these five decisions, covering all three subject areas, the Court
used the dictionary as an affirmative component although it was
never of primary or even substantial weight. There are numerous
additional cases from our dataset in which the majority opinion
author invoked dictionary definitions as nominally supportive while
relying to a far greater extent on other interpretive resources.272
Indeed, Court opinions using the dictionary for essentially ornamen-
tal purposes constitute the largest of our three general categories,
comprising more than half the majority opinions that we
classified.273 
One might see little reason for concern regarding the repeated
invocation of a resource that plays only a subsidiary or marginal
role in the majority’s analysis. But in understanding how the
Court’s overall interpretive approach has evolved, a resource’s
location and persistence can have a cumulative effect. The dictio-
nary’s frequent appearance near the start of the Court’s reasoning,
as an integral component of textual analysis, creates an impression
270. See id. at 147-48.
271. See id. at 144 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1598 (1961)
(defining “otherwise” to mean “in a different way or manner”)). Breyer incorporated the
definition by contending that it could refer to a crime that is different from the listed examples
in one respect, “the way or manner ... it produces [a] risk”, but similar in another respect, “the
degree of risk it produces.” Id.
272. See, e.g., New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2642-43 (2010) (Stevens, J.);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112-13 (2008) (Breyer, J.); Cook Co., Ill. v. United
States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125-29 (2003) (Souter, J.); Muscarello v. United States,
524 U.S. 125, 128-32 (1998) (Breyer, J.); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.); H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1989) (Brennan, J.).
273. Of the fifty majority opinions that we reviewed with an eye toward classifying them
in a general category, thirty-one used the dictionary essentially for ornamental purposes,
eleven used it as a way station, and six used it as a barrier. The other two majorities, Bailey
and Abuelhawa, fell into the notice opinions category, although they could also be classified
as using dictionary definitions in ornamental fashion. See Abuelhawa v. United States, 566
U.S. 816, 820-24 (2009); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142-45 (1995).
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that the lexicographic method is fundamentally legitimating and
should matter more than many, if not most, other interpretive
resources.
As we have explained, this dictionary emphasis is a very new
development steadily fostered over the past twenty-five years by the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. It has supplanted prior approaches
in which judges used their own common sense or analogical powers
to determine ordinary meaning, or inquired more vigorously into
Congress’s intended meaning. And even though the Justices
continue to rely on both their own introspective analysis and the
record of Congress’s intentions, the dictionary’s recently elevated
status effectively invites them to accord a diminished role to these
other resources. The final group of cases illustrates one effect of that
invitation.
D. The Dictionary as a Barrier
In Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, the Court
recently held that Rule 10b-5’s prohibition against the making of
material misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities did not apply to a mutual fund advisor because the
false statements appeared in documents formally issued by the
mutual fund, not by the investment advisor that created them.274
Writing for a five-person majority, Justice Thomas relied initially
and substantially on his choice of a general dictionary definition for
“make.”275 In the Court’s view, this definition was so clear and the
implications of a different meaning so adverse that it foreclosed any
need to examine either agency intent in promulgating the rule or
agency practice in applying it.
The majority’s chosen definition specifies that when “make” is
followed by “a noun expressing the action of a verb,” the entire
phrase is “approximately equivalent in sense to that verb.”276 Under
this dictionary approach, to make a promise is the equivalent of to
274. 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301-05 (2011) (applying Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)).
275. See id. at 2302-03.
276. Id. at 2302 (quoting 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 66 (1933); WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1485 (2d ed. 1934)).
556 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:483
promise, and one “makes” a statement by stating it.277 Accordingly,
for the purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of the contested statement
was the mutual fund that had ultimate formal authority over its
content and any decision to communicate it.278 An investment
advisory firm that prepares or publishes the statement on behalf of
the fund is not a maker of the statement, just as a speechwriter does
not make a statement when the politician for whom he wrote the
speech delivers it.279 
Justice Thomas recognized the presence of a respectable alter-
native definition of “make” as “create” in the sense of causing
something to exist or occur.280 Although this definition might be
acceptable when the word is paired with an object not associated
with a verb, such as making a chair, it “fails to capture [the correct]
meaning when directed at an object expressing the action of a
verb.”281 Moreover, because Thomas found the meaning of “make” in
Rule 10b-5 to be unambiguously clear, he declined to consider the
Government’s argument that the Securities & Exchange Com-
mission’s position warranted deference.282
The Court’s dictionary approach in Janus Capital erected a
barrier to responsible judicial review. In determining that a certain
definition of the verb “make” was unequivocally correct even though
the dictionaries it consulted contained multiple alternative senses
of that word,283 the Court demonstrated its selective approach to
dictionaries. Under other well-recognized definitions of the verb,
corporate employees or advisors may be said to “make” statements
even though they and their statements are subject to the control of
more senior officials or boards of directors.284 
277. See id.
278. See id. at 2305.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 2303.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 2303 n.8.
283. See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 235-43 (2d ed. 1989) (listing more than seventy
different definitional senses of verb “to make”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1363-64 (1986) (listing more than forty senses of the verb “make” that are not
obsolete or dialect). 
284. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 758 (2d ed. 1982) (defining “make” as “to
perform” as in “make a bow”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1363 (1986)
(defining “make” as “compose, write” with reference to verses and epigrams). See generally
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2307 (Breyer, J.,
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Moreover, by insisting that the dictionary-defined text was
unambiguous, the Court felt free to minimize or ignore the Agency’s
contextual contentions. Specifically, the Court had no answer to the
argument that an investment advisor may be held primarily liable
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act because, in
contrast to secondary actors like lawyers or accountants, an adviser
is the equivalent to a corporate insider, exercising daily manage-
ment control over the mutual fund.285 Further, given plausible
conflicting definitions of the verb “make,” the SEC’s interpretation
of that term in briefs and adjudication ought to have received some
level of deference.286 The majority argued that its dictionary-based
approach was supported by Supreme Court precedent, but Justice
Breyer, in dissent, cast serious doubt on that position,287 and
corporate law scholars have criticized the Court’s definitional
approach.288 In the end, the Court reached a conservative result,
confining implied rights of action under Rule 10b-5 by dismissing
the Agency’s purposive and deference-based arguments in favor of
an “ordinary meaning” analysis derived from its subjective choice of
dictionary definitions.
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Company, the issue was whether a
privately negotiated resale of all corporate stock was covered by
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which creates a cause of
action against sellers who make material misrepresentations “by
means of a prospectus.”289 Writing for a five-member majority,
Justice Kennedy held that the term “prospectus” referred only to
documents describing a public offering of securities, not private
dissenting with Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.)
285. See Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17-18, Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (No. 09-
525).
286. See generally SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002) (using SEC standards as
guideline for interpreting a section 10(b) issue); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
287. See Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2307-08 (Breyer J., dissenting with Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.). 
288. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars?  Janus Capital and Conservative
Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 933, 933-35 (2013); Colin Talia, Note, Janus
Capital Group: How “Making” a Statement Leads to Insulation from Liability, 38 J. CORP. LAW
197, 206-16 (2012). 
289. 513 U.S. 561, 564 (1995).
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agreements to sell securities.290 In reaching this conclusion,
Kennedy relied in important respects on a legal dictionary definition
for “prospectus” while discounting Congress’s statutory definition,
the statute’s drafting history, and the Agency’s consistent interpre-
tation of the word over decades.
The majority acknowledged that “prospectus” was defined in
section 2 of the Act, in terms seemingly broad enough to cover
private sales.291 But the Court, relying on how “prospectus” was
understood in certain other parts of the Act, reasoned that section
2's definition had to be harmonized not only with section 12’s
creation of a right of action but also with other sections of the
statute.292 In order to achieve this harmonization, Justice Kennedy
looked to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “prospectus” at
the time of the statute’s enactment.293 He then used the dictionary
definition, which referred to public solicitations, along with two
language canons to conclude that although the statutory definition
includes “any ... communication ... which ... confirms the sale of any
security,”294 the covered “communications” must be “prospectus-like”
in the sense of relating to an initial public offering.295
The majority’s dictionary analysis in Gustafson was not as
explicitly preclusive as in Janus Capital. Nonetheless, the effect of
the Court’s reasoning was comparable. In its quest for an “ordinary
meaning” resolution narrowing the scope of “prospectus,” the
majority effectively ignored the statutory context—an extraordi-
narily broad definition provided by Congress.296 Further, the Court’s
reliance on the dictionary along with semantic canons enabled it to
sidestep other contextual factors. These included extensive drafting
history indicating Congress was consciously creating a broad
290. See id. at 584.
291. See id. at 573-74. The statutory definition reads as follows: “The term ‘prospectus’
means any prospectus, notice, circular advertisement, letter, or communication, written or
by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security.”
15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (2006).
292. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568-76 (discussing meaning of prospectus in sections 10
and 5 as limited to public offerings).
293. See id. at 575-76.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10).
295. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575-76 (relying on noscitur a sociis and rule against
surplusage).
296. See id. at 584-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting, with Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
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definition of “prospectus”;297 a consistent agency position on the
meaning of prospectus set forth over a prolonged period administer-
ing the Act;298 and the understanding expressed immediately after
the Act’s passage by key legal scholars who had been closely
consulted during the drafting process.299 Once again, the Court’s
dictionary reliance contributed to a conservative result that was
inconsistent with highly probative evidence of what Congress and
the Executive Branch understood and intended the term to mean.
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the issue presented was
whether plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)300 in a mixed-motive
factual setting had to produce direct evidence of discrimination or
only circumstantial evidence.301 The Supreme Court previously
addressed the concept of mixed motive discrimination302 in the
closely analogous Title VII setting.303 The Court construed the Title
VII language to mean that if the plaintiff-employee proved an
illegitimate factor304 played a motivating part in her adverse
employment decision, the defendant-employer was liable unless she
established that she would have made the same decision anyway
based on non-discriminatory factors.305 In the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
Congress endorsed this two-part test while adding a new section to
Title VII, stating that if a plaintiff demonstrated that race, sex, or
another listed trait was “a motivating factor,” she established an
297. See id. at 599-600 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, with Breyer, J.).
298. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, 40-44,
Gustafson, 513 U.S. 561 (No. 93-404).
299. Id. at 39-42 (citing views expressed by Arthur Dean, Felix Frankfurter, and William
O. Douglas); see also Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 601 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing views
expressed by Frankfurter and Douglas).
300. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
301. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009). 
302. Mixed motive discrimination involves a challenged employment decision that allegedly
consists of both a lawful business justification and an impermissible discriminatory intent.
303. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1989). Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination “because of” an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The ADEA, enacted three years later, adopted the
exact same prohibitory language when employers act “because of” an individual’s age. 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
304. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
305. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-245 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.); id. at 258-
60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265-67 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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unlawful employment practice allowing for declaratory and
injunctive relief.306 
Against this background, the Court in Gross reached out to decide
an issue not raised in the petition for certiorari: whether a mixed-
motive discrimination claim may be brought under the ADEA at
all.307 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Thomas held that
the answer was no.308
Thomas focused on the text of the ADEA and the assumption that
the ordinary meaning of this language should be controlling.309 The
ADEA prohibits employment discrimination “because of” an
individual’s age, just as Title VII prohibits such discrimination
“because of” an individual’s race or sex.310 Justice Thomas consulted
several dictionaries to determine that the ordinary meaning of
“because of” was “by reason of” or “on account of.”311 Accordingly, he
concluded that under the plain language of the ADEA, a plaintiff
must prove that age was the reason or “but-for” cause of any adverse
employment action, and that the burden of proof never shifts to
defendant employer during this process.312
The decision in Gross has been sharply criticized, by the four
dissenters, by legal scholars, and by commentators.313 The Court’s
determination to address and decide a major issue of statutory
interpretation that the parties had not briefed, without considering
306. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m),
2000e-5(g)(2006)).
307. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 173.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 175-77.
310. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2006), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2). See
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978) (describing how Congress drafted this ADEA
language to be precisely identical to Title VII).
311. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (quoting 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 194 (1996); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1933); RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132 (1996)).
312. See id. 
313. See, e.g., id. at 180-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting with Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.);
id. at 190-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting with Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.); Michael Foreman, Gross
v. FBL Financial Services—Oh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 681, 682 (2010); Deborah A.
Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV 859, 889 (2012); Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Working to
Overturn Justices’ Ruling on Age Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A20; Protect Older Workers
from Age Discrimination, AARP (July 2, 2012), http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/
info-07-2012/WAARPS-age-discrimination.html.
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the views of the federal agency charged with administering the
statute, was attacked as irresponsible activism.314 More important
for our purposes, the majority relied on dictionary definitions while
disregarding the Court’s well-settled precedent and Congress’s
evident intent.
The Court in its Price Waterhouse decision had construed the
identical “because of” phrase in Title VII to mean “a motivating
factor.”315 In doing so, the Court expressly concluded that “because
of” did not mean “solely because of.”316 Although this was a Title VII
case, the Court has regularly relied on its Title VII decisions when
construing analogous language in the ADEA.317 Further, the Court’s
reasoning was entirely consistent with the mixed-motive burden-
shifting approach it had adopted over three decades with respect to
other statutory employment provisions and workplace constitutional
claims as well.318 Accordingly, federal agencies administering Title
VII and the ADEA had long applied this burden-shifting approach.
In addition, Congress in 1991 endorsed the Court’s burden-shifting
test, codifying “a motivating factor” as its standard for determining
whether affirmative relief is warranted under Title VII and thereby
rejecting the “but-for” causation standard.319
The majority in Gross attempted to justify its dictionary-based
fresh start through a legislative inaction argument, contending that
Congress’s failure to codify the same standard for the ADEA in 1991
when it modified Title VII indicated an intention to uncouple the
meaning of the two “because of” provisions.320 That argument cannot
314. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 181-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Widiss, supra note 313, at 890.
315. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989).
316. See id. at 241 & n.7 (emphasizing that Congress had rejected an amendment placing
“solely” before “because of”).
317. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143-44 (2000);
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). See generally Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (noting that substantive provisions of the ADEA “were
derived in haec verba from Title VII” (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
318. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 394-95, 405 (1983) (construing
National Labor Relations Act antidiscrimination provision); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (construing First Amendment).
319. See Widiss, supra note 313, at 884-85 (describing Congress’s codification of “a
motivating factor” standard set forth in the earlier Supreme Court decision, and referencing
key committee report discussion). 
320. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175-77 (2009).
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withstand scrutiny,321 but in any event it leaves the majority
invoking an ordinary meaning that the Court had squarely rejected
in a decision that remains settled law. The case provides yet another
illustration of how the Court uses dictionary definitions to ignore or
reject larger contextual factors, including congressional intent and
its own precedent, in order to reach a conservative result.
Our final case example, Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v.
NLRB, involved a challenge to a Labor Board standard regulating
employer internal polls that are conducted to determine whether
employees support the incumbent union.322 The Court held that the
Board’s standard was rational, but the majority then used a
dictionary definition to revise the standard’s meaning contrary to
longstanding agency practice; in doing so, it substantially reduced
the burden placed on employers.
Charged with administering the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), the Labor Board concluded over an extended period that a
unionized employer’s polling of its own workers regarding their
support for the union has the potential to unsettle these employees
and to disrupt established bargaining relationships. Accordingly,
through a series of decisions, the Board created a standard—that in
order to poll, employers must demonstrate “a reasonable doubt,
based on objective considerations, that the union continued to enjoy”
majority support in the bargaining unit.323
Although he held this “reasonable doubt” standard to be rational
and consistent with the NLRA, Justice Scalia rejected, on substan-
tial evidence grounds, the Board’s factual finding that the employer
in the present case lacked such reasonable doubt.324 The linchpin for
321. See Widiss, supra note 313, at 893-900 (demonstrating in depth how the majority in
Gross mischaracterized the facts regarding what the 1991 Civil Rights Act did to modify the
ADEA and also misapplied relevant precedent).
322. 522 U.S. 359, 361 (1998).
323. Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Scalia, J.); id. at 389 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court had an unusual structure, as it was joined
in different parts by separate groups of four Justices. See id. at 360. Scalia’s conclusion that
the Board’s “reasonable doubt” standard was rational and consistent with the NLRA was
joined by liberal Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 360, 365. Scalia’s
conclusion that the Board’s factual finding in this instance was not supported by substantial
evidence—based on the proper meaning of “doubt”—was joined by conservative Justices
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 360, 371, 380.
324. See Allentown Mack Sales, 522 U.S. at 364-66 (upholding rationality of standard); id.
at 366-68 (rejecting application of standard to this record).
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this evidentiary determination was Scalia’s reliance on dictionaries
to establish the meaning of “doubt.”325 The Board had regularly
construed its own standard to mean that an employer was required
to have reasonable grounds for disbelief that the union enjoyed
continuing majority support.326 But Justice Scalia invoked dictio-
nary definitions and concluded that an employer need only have
genuine and reasonable uncertainty about whether the union
retained majority support.327 Applying this newly revised standard
to the direct and circumstantial evidence in the record, Scalia
determined that no rational fact-finder could avoid the conclusion
that this employer “had reasonable good-faith grounds to doubt—to
be uncertain about—the union’s retention of majority support.”328
The Board’s “reasonable doubt” standard had often been criti-
cized, principally because the Agency required the same factual
showing to justify three different types of employer challenges to an
incumbent union: an employer poll, an employer decision to seek an
election, and an employer determination to withdraw recognition.329
But having upheld the standard as rational and consistent with the
Act, the Court’s decision to reject the Agency’s own construction and
rewrite the standard’s meaning is remarkable. Similar to what
occurred in Gross, the linguistic issue the Court resolved by using
a dictionary was not raised at all in the certiorari petition, and
neither party discussed dictionary definitions of “doubt” in their
briefs.330 The Court’s two-stage analysis generated an illusion of
agency deference that disappeared when the majority insisted on its
own meaning for a key word, a word that had been chosen by the
Agency when formulating its standard. In rejecting the Agency’s
ability to give content to its own rules, the majority supplanted the
325. See id. at 367, 380.
326. See id. at 367.
327. See id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 775 (2d ed. 1939); NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 754 (1993); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 555 (2d
ed. 1992)).
328. Id. at 371.
329. See id. at 361 (describing challenge by petitioner); id. at 380-81 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). See generally Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges
to Incumbent Unions, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 653, 653-54 (1991).
330. See Brief of Petitioner, Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. 359 (No. 96-795); Brief for the
NLRB, Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. 359 (No. 96-795).
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Board’s long-recognized technical expertise in labor relations331 with
its preferred dictionary approach. 
This group of majority opinions is considerably smaller than the
ornament category,332 but that is hardly surprising. We would
expect the Justices to invoke dictionaries far more often in conjunc-
tion with heretofore traditional interpretive resources, as opposed
to using dictionary definitions to foreclose serious consideration of
those resources. At the same time, the Court’s reliance on dictionar-
ies as a barrier, its willingness to elevate ad hoc choices of defini-
tions in such a radically acontextual manner, extends beyond the
cases reviewed in our dataset.333 Such decisions would have been
inconceivable prior to 1987; they now occur with disturbing
frequency.
331. See generally NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990)
(discussing the need to provide deference for Board rules); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (discussing Labor Board’s experience and specialized knowledge).
332. In addition to the four barrier cases addressed at length in this section, we also note
from our dataset two criminal law decisions. In Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225
(1993), the Court held that trading a gun for narcotics constitutes “use” of a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and thereby qualifies for a specified mandatory
sentence. Justice O’Connor for the majority relied heavily on a dictionary definition of “use”
as meaning “convert to one’s service” and concluded that this meaning of using a firearm as
an article of exchange was sufficiently ordinary and clear so that the rule of lenity did not
come into play. See id. at 228-29, 239-41. Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens
and Souter, emphasized that the dictionary contains a wide range of meanings for the verb
“use,” that the most normal meaning in this statutory criminal punishment context is to use
as a weapon rather than as an object of barter, and that the majority’s restrictive dictionary
approach discounted not only lenity, but also Congress’s apparent purpose. See id. at 241-47
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Because the rigid definitional approach in Smith has been thoroughly
examined and criticized by other scholars, we limit our treatment here to footnote status. See,
e.g., SOLAN, supra note 100, at 57-59, 69; Aprill, supra note 4, at 319; Hoffman, supra note 4,
at 420-23; Looking It Up, supra note 4, at 1443; Rubin, supra note 4, at 190-91, 198-200; see
also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 133-37 (1993) (relying on unambiguous dictionary
definition of “conviction” to preclude reliance on prior prosecution practices, previous Supreme
Court and lower court decisions, and the rule of lenity).
333. Looking at the Court’s 2011-2012 Term, see, for example, Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170 (2012) (invoking dictionary definitions to justify
rejection of longstanding agency regulations and guidelines); supra text accompanying notes
61-71 (discussing Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012)).
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E. Analysis 
In Part II, we identified two substantial problems that may arise
when the Supreme Court utilizes dictionary definitions as an
interpretive resource. One problem is extrinsically rooted, deriving
from the acontextual nature of dictionaries. There is a real risk that
judges, in their search for correct or appropriate definitions, will
ignore background understandings about the words in dispute. This
larger background context often involves understandings from the
Congress that enacted the words, from agencies that have applied
the words, and even from the Court itself as it has construed the
words in prior decisions. The second problem is intrinsically rooted,
stemming from the diverse taxonomy of dictionaries. Given that
“[w]hat distinguishes [dictionaries] is more notable than what they
have in common,”334 the risk is that judges will overlook or ignore
salient differences and instead engage in selective reliance on the
particular dictionary, definition, or edition date that is congenial to
their notion of what the word should mean. 
Our empirical findings in Part III and our doctrinal review in
Part IV demonstrate that the Supreme Court has succumbed to both
kinds of risk. Below, we discuss the second problem, involving the
Court’s selective reliance on dictionary brands, definitions, and
edition dates, in Part IV.E.1. We then address the Court’s disturb-
ing neglect of background understandings about the contested words
or terms in Subsection Two.335 Finally, we explain in Subsection
Three why the Court’s misuse of dictionaries is of special concern as
334. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 49, at 21.
335. We have amply dealt with the Court’s use of dictionaries for notice purposes in its
criminal law decisions. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.C, IV.A. We would add only that for both
liberal and conservative Justices, this notice function seems relatively distinct from their
ideological profiles. Thus, for example, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have used dictionary
definitions to determine that statutory text is clear enough to support affirming defendants’
convictions. See Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 31-35 & n.3 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
majority); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127-31 (1998) (Breyer, J., majority). And
Justices Scalia and O’Connor have invoked dictionaries to conclude that the statutory scope
does not extend to defendant’s conduct, supporting a reversal of their convictions. See James
v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 218-19, 230-31 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1995) (O’Connor, J., majority), superseded by statute, Act of Nov.
13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in Abbott v. United States, 181
S. Ct. 18 (2010).
566 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:483
a normative matter and when compared to criticisms of how the
Justices use or misuse other interpretive assets.
1. Dictionaries and Subjectivity 
Based on findings from our dataset, we demonstrated the Court’s
highly subjective and ad hoc approach to choosing dictionaries. The
Justices typically rely on one, or at most two, dictionaries to define
a contested word; they use general and legal dictionaries inter-
changeably and without any apparent rationale; they lack a
predominant practice regarding whether dictionaries chosen were
published close to enactment date, to filing date, or neither; and
they have adopted individualized yet uneven approaches to their
preferred dictionary brands. We found this persistently subjective
approach to dictionary use to be characteristic of both liberal and
conservative Justices. At the same time, the tendency to cherry-pick
dictionaries and definitions seems more casually opportunistic with
respect to the Court’s ornamental opinions but more purposefully
motivated when the dictionary is used as a barrier.
Subjectivity and discretion are admittedly inescapable elements
of the interpretive enterprise. But while no judicially invoked
resource is immune, certain recognized distinctions among
dictionaries—such as general versus legal, collegiate versus
unabridged, publication date in relation to enactment versus case
filing—have the potential to generate broadly objective constraints
on the exercise of judicial discretion. Ironically, dictionaries differ
in this particular respect from the judicially-created canons of
construction that are celebrated by Justice Scalia and other
textualists. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have relied on well
over 160 different language and substantive canons since 1986336
without ever developing or even suggesting an intelligible frame-
work of priorities. Moreover, such a framework seems unimaginable
given that judicial priorities set forth in the Court’s substantive
canons promote a vast array of normative values and policy
preferences and that Congress’s complex statutory schemes, revised
336. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., 2012 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, FOURTH EDITION 197-218 (2012)
(listing over 160 canons with case citations).
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and extended over many years, tend toward indeterminacy on
questions of structural coherence or linguistic consistency.337
Perhaps even more ironically, dictionaries—as resources created
independent of the judiciary and organized in relation to the actual
practices of language users—bear some resemblance to legislative
history. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s critique that legislative
history usage is like looking over a cocktail party crowd for one’s
friends, the Court has long recognized a general or presumptive
authoritative hierarchy among the various resources generated by
Congress as part of the enactment process.338 And that presumptive
hierarchy is based on the actual practices of congressional lawmak-
ing. Thus, standing committee and conference committee reports
traditionally are accorded the most weight based on the central role
played by these committees in drafting, justifying, and negotiating
about text.339 Explanatory floor statements by bill sponsors or
managers are deemed almost as reliable.340 Post-enactment history
and legislative inaction have far less authoritative status because
they are viewed as shedding little light on what legislators under-
stood a contested text to mean when they voted to enact it.341
Comparably distinct systemic choices are available to the Justices
regarding identifiable differences among dictionaries. For instance,
337. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1089-94
(1995) [hereinafter Frickey, Faithful Interpretation] (discussing language canons); Philip P.
Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1987-90 (2005) [hereinafter
Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change] (discussing substantive canons). See generally Brudney,
supra note 184, at 1202, 1229-30.
338. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (discussing substantial weight
ordinarily given to standing committee reports); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 17-18
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing substantial weight given to conference
committee reports); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 318 (2009) (discussing weight giv-
en to sponsor statements); Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2507 (2010) (discussing
minimal weight given to post-enactment legislative history). See generally WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 311-13 (2d ed. 2006);
KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 172-75 (1999).
339. See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77
(1996) (Stevens, J., concurring); ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 338, at 311-12.
340. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982); ESKRIDGE, JR.
ET AL., supra note 338, at 312; GREENAWALT, supra note 338, at 173.
341. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081-82 (2011) (Scalia, J.)
(discussing post-enactment history); John Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for
Legislative Intent: A Venture into “Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 740 (1984)
(discussing legislative inaction).
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the preference for a legal or general dictionary might be based on
the nature of the word being defined, or the likelihood that the
audience for the statute is the proverbial man-in-the-street as
opposed to an attorney counseling regulated corporations or
individuals. Reliance on enactment or case-filing publication dates
might reflect a broad preference either for how the enacting
Congress likely understood the words it enacted or for how current
readers likely understand the same words. 
These preferences need not be rigid rules. They can be presump-
tions that are overcome in appropriately identified circumstances,
just as the legislative history hierarchy is a presumptive rather
than rule-bound framework. For example, it may well be preferable
for the Court to make use of a wide range of dictionaries in a given
case so as to minimize the risks of biased or arbitrary selection.
However, if the Justices are inclined to invoke a more limited
number of dictionaries, as has been their current practice, they
might follow the example of at least one state supreme court342 and
strive for a greater degree of institutional consistency in their
choices—again to minimize subjectivity or cherry-picking.
In the end, an articulated and transparent set of presumptions is
possible with respect to dictionaries, and, over more than a decade,
scholars have proposed that some such framework might help
diminish the subjective element of the Court’s dictionary jurispru-
dence.343 The Court, however, has steadfastly refused to adhere to
any set of preferences, much less announce such an approach. By
declining to identify a principled basis for its dictionary selections,
the Justices continue to pursue an opaque strategy with regard to
an interpretive resource that possesses a range of objectively
342. The Missouri Supreme Court has adopted a practice of using Webster’s Third when
attempting to define a word in its customary usage. The Court’s approach is not based on any
formal rule or guideline, but its practice of using one dictionary as “standard” is understood
to limit the possibility of seeking out a dictionary that supports a preferred outcome. See E-
mail from Bill Thompson, Clerk of Missouri Supreme Court, to James Brudney (March 20,
2013, 12:03 PM) (on file with authors). 
343. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 192-97 (recommending that the Court justify choice of
dictionary and definition, use multiple dictionaries, and account for weaknesses in older
dictionaries); see also Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress:
Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV.
1915, 1951-66 (2010) (recommending that the Court adopt a corpus method approach using
electronic databases).
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distinguishable features. In so doing, the Court exacerbates the
subjective element of its dictionary practices.
2. Ornaments, Barriers, and the Ideology of the Justices
Turning to dictionaries’ more general functions in the Court’s
opinions, we focus on the affirmative roles that dictionary defini-
tions play in reaching a result, whether as ornaments or as
barriers.344 As discussed in Part III, we found no statistically
meaningful relationship between the Justices’ ideological positions
and their use of dictionaries. But our review of majority opinions in
cases where the dictionary functions as an ornament or a barrier
suggests the presence of interesting differences between liberals and
conservatives.345
Ornament opinions constitute the bulk of dictionary-using
majorities, and liberal justices appear to author approximately two-
thirds of these opinions.346 Moreover, liberal justices did not author
any barrier majority opinions we identified from our dataset. Upon
reflection, this distribution is not surprising given liberals’ philo-
sophical approach to statutory interpretation.
344. The Court’s use of dictionary definitions as a way station is similar to its dictionary
use as an ornament in certain respects. The Court consults dictionaries for both types of cases
and it typically does so early in a majority opinion, thereby elevating the importance of
dictionaries as a resource. But because dictionary definitions are explicitly deflected or
bypassed in these way station cases, their role is less influential than in the ornament
decisions.
345. This discussion of apparent differences between majorities authored by liberals and
conservatives is not based on the kind of empirical analyses presented in Part III. In our
examination in Part IV of the four distinct functions that dictionaries serve, we reviewed and
categorized fifty majority opinions—more than two-fifths of the majorities in our dataset. As
we reported, thirty-one fall into the ornament category and six are classified as barrier
opinions. See supra note 273. We drew our substantial sample from a cross-section of Justices
and time-periods, but it would take considerable additional time and effort to review all 117
majorities in this way. See supra note 273.
346. We discuss five of these majorities in the text accompanying notes 230-71 supra, and
list six others in note 272 supra. The remaining twenty Court opinions that we have classified
as using the dictionary for ornamental purposes are on a list available from the authors. See
notes on file with authors. Of the thirty-one majorities in the ornamental category, twenty
were authored by liberals and eleven by conservatives; two of those eleven by Justice White,
who was a more moderate conservative than Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts. See
supra note 144. 
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The liberals in our dataset are not textualists in the mold of
conservatives such as Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy.347
Instead, these liberal Justices generally follow a legal process
approach. They begin with textual analysis but then also consider
legislative history and purpose, agency deference, practical conse-
quences, and other factors—either to confirm and reinforce their
conclusions about textual meaning, to resolve what they regard as
inconclusive statutory language, or occasionally to supersede the
apparent meaning of text.348 For liberal Justices like Breyer,
Stevens, Souter, or Blackmun, semantic tools such as the dictionary
and language canons are more supplemental than primary. They
serve as part of a broader web of interpretive resources, allowing the
Court to derive meaning from legislative and pragmatic contexts as
well as from literal text.349 
The liberals’ approach to dictionary usage appears to comport
with the position expressed by Professors Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks in the famous teaching materials they prepared.350 Hart and
Sacks, the progenitors of the legal process school, insisted that even
an unabridged dictionary “never says what meaning a word must
bear in a particular context.”351 Rather, as “an historical record, not
necessarily all-inclusive, of the meanings which words in fact have
borne,”352 a dictionary’s more modest function is “simply [to] answer
the question whether a particular meaning is linguistically permis-
347. We include Justice Kennedy as a textualist, even though he is not unalterably opposed
to consulting legislative history, because he tends to foreclose consideration of such history
or congressional purpose materials when he concludes that the text, as illuminated by
dictionaries and/or language canons, is sufficiently clear. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001); Public Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)
superseded by statute, Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat.
978, as recognized in Meachem v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab. 554 U.S. 84 (2008).
348. For examples of liberal justices using this broader legal process approach outside the
dictionary context, see CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 429-56 (2008) (Breyer,
J.); N.Y. Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-57 (1995)
(Souter, J.); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160-64 (1990) (Stevens, J.). 
349. Compare Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 28, at 45-47 (analyzing how liberal Justices
Stevens and Blackmun use language canons differently from conservative Justices Scalia and
Thomas), with id. at 113-16 (noting that Scalia and Thomas rely on fewer interpretive
resources overall to explain and justify their results than do Stevens and Blackmun). 
350. HENRY M. HART. JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994).
351. Id. at 1190.
352. Id. at 1191.
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sible, if the context warrants it.”353 Like Hart and Sacks, the liberal
Justices in our dataset regularly consult the dictionary to establish
a linguistically permissible definition while relying on the larger
statutory context to arrive at what they consider the correct or
appropriate result.354 Liberals in these majority opinions recognize
that the broader and more complex statutory setting is ultimately
determinative of textual meaning; their use of dictionary definitions
is affirmatively probative but in the end adds only supplemental or
marginal value. 
Yet, in one respect the liberal Justices’ ornamental approach goes
beyond what Hart and Sacks contemplated. By consulting dictionary
definitions at the outset of their analysis, liberal Justices have
subtly conveyed the impression that dictionaries have the capacity
not only to identify what is linguistically permissible but to shape
what is linguistically preferable. That impression elevates the
status of dictionaries, suggesting that they perform a special role in
determining ordinary meaning. To be sure, liberal Justices occasion-
ally refer to dictionaries as confirmatory after having established
the proper meaning of a contested term based on illustrative
common usage or larger context.355 This post-hoc approach seems
truer to the Hart and Sacks formulation described above, but it is
not the primary way in which liberal Justices invoke dictionaries for
ornamental purposes. 
One empirical finding that arguably reinforces the link between
liberals and the ornamental function involves the liberal Justices’
unwillingness, compared with their conservative colleagues, to use
dictionaries in their dissenting opinions when the majority opinion
invokes dictionaries. Liberal Justices, especially Breyer and
Stevens, who were frequent dissenters in this setting, invoke
353. Id. at 1191 (emphasis added).
354. See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2642 (2010) (Stevens, J.)
(consulting the dictionary to establish permissible definition of “quorum” while emphasizing
that the definition does not resolve central issue regarding exercise of delegated authority);
supra text accompanying notes 249-57 (discussing Justice Souter’s choice of one dictionary
definition of “oppose” over another as appropriate based on contextual factors in Crawford v.
Nashville); supra text accompanying notes 264-71 (discussing Justice Breyer’s choice of a
dictionary definition of “otherwise” as appropriate in light of larger context in Begay v. United
States).
355. See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142-44 (2008) (Breyer, J.); Watson v.
United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79-80 n.7 (2007) (Souter, J.).
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dictionaries significantly less often than conservatives, notably
Justices Scalia and Alito, who are also frequent dissenters.356
Perhaps liberals contesting a majority opinion that features
dictionary usage regard this definitions element as simply not
important enough to warrant rebuttal. By contrast, conservatives
authoring a dissent are inclined to see dictionary-based ordinary
meaning as a central part of their disagreement with the
majority.357 
All of this is not to suggest that the use of dictionary definitions
for ornamental reasons is confined to liberal Justices, or that their
majorities using dictionaries as ornaments invariably reach liberal
results. Conservatives also author ornamental majority opinions as
we demonstrated in analyzing Justice Alito’s opinion in Mac’s Shell
and Justice Scalia’s opinion in Dastar. For conservative Justices, the
larger context tends to involve not legislative history or agency
deference but rather judicially derived factors such as linguistic
canons, structural analyses of statutes, common law developments,
and precedent.358 Still, their primary reliance on a larger statutory
setting in these cases resembles the liberals’ approach in reducing
dictionary definitions to a marginal role.
On the other hand, the six barrier cases we identified were all
authored by conservative Justices: two by Justices Thomas and
Scalia, and one by Justices Kennedy and O’Connor.359 With the
356. See supra Part.III.A.4 (finding that conservatives cited dictionaries in 41.2 percent of
their thirty-four dissenting opinions while liberals cited dictionaries less than half as
often—in 19.6 percent of their forty-six dissents). 
357. An alternate, more strategic, hypothesis is that liberals tend to use dictionaries when
drafting majorities to help solidify consensus or retain their more textualist colleagues, but
they feel no comparable need to do so when authoring a dissent. See supra note 147
(suggesting that the alternate hypothesis may help explain Justice Breyer’s heavy dictionary
use in majority opinions). This strategic account also suggests that dictionaries may serve
more of a supplemental or marginal function for liberals than conservatives.
358. See Mac’s Shell Serv., Inc v. Shell Oil Prod., 130 S. Ct. 1251, 1253 (2010) (relying on
technical meaning of “constructive” from analogous employment and housing fields and on the
judicial manageability of a standard); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 539 U.S.
23, 33-34 (2003) (relying on structural relation of trademark to copyright and on Court
precedent).
359. Thomas authored Janus Capital and Gross; Scalia authored Allentown Mack and Deal;
Kennedy authored Gustafson, and O’Connor authored Smith. All six of these decisions also
reached conservative results. See supra Part IV.D. The two additional barrier opinions from
the 2011-12 Term, were authored by Justice Alito; each reached a conservative result. See
supra note 333.
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exception of Justice O’Connor, these Justices are textualists in
addition to being conservatives. It is hardly surprising that
textualists are likely to invoke dictionary-based ordinary meaning
to foreclose consideration of factors such as legislative history or
agency deference. For a textualist, once the meaning of disputed
statutory language is clear on its face, the result is effectively
settled and those additional contextual resources need not be
consulted. Using a dictionary to help establish the text’s lack of
ambiguity is wholly consistent with this approach.
Conservative and textualist Justices are not unaware of the risk
that dictionaries may function as barriers in the Court’s opinions.
Indeed, cases from our dataset illustrate that Justices Thomas and
Scalia are at times sensitive to the problem of such dictionary
misuse. Justice Thomas in his Gustafson dissent excoriates the
majority for allowing a dictionary definition to trump the “extraordi-
narily broad” meaning that Congress provided in its own statutory
definition.360 Justice Scalia in his Smith dissent criticizes the Court
for failing to distinguish between permissible dictionary meanings
and the appropriate statutory meaning drawn from a larger
context.361 In his recent book, he also cautions against judicial
carelessness in ignoring basic principles of dictionary organiza-
tion.362 
Despite such expressions of concern, however, it is Scalia,
Thomas, and other conservative Justices who have authored the
barrier decisions that we identified. Moreover, these barrier
opinions reflect a traditional textualist methodological perspective
that has been evident elsewhere in the Court’s more recent statu-
tory jurisprudence.363 The Court reaches conservative results by
using dictionary-based analysis to arrive at “ordinary meaning”
while refusing to consider contextual resources—notably resources
360. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas also has shown a willingness to bypass dictionary definitions as unhelpful when they
fail to address the issue in dispute. See supra text accompanying notes 207-213 (discussing
Thomas’s majority opinion in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)). 
361. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
362. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
363. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 28, at 77-94 (examining a series of Rehnquist
Court decisions that assigned elevated status to language and substantive canons, allowing
canons-based reasoning to foreclose consideration of potentially probative evidence on
congressional intent).
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derived from the politically accountable branches that reflect either
what the enacting Congress might have intended or what the
implementing agency understood the text to mean. 
3. Why Dictionaries are Different
Dictionaries were virtually never cited by the Court before 1986,
whereas in 2013 they may well be invoked by the Justices as often
as canons or legislative history. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s complaint
about the 1940s “invasion of legislative history into judicial interpre-
tation”364 would seem to apply in spades to the tsunami of dictionary
definition references starting in the late 1980s. The apparent
justification for this new dictionary culture is the role of dictionaries
as a means of identifying ordinary meaning. We say “apparent”
because there has been relatively little explanation from the
Justices themselves for why the Court has embraced dictionary
definitions.
Assuming that discerning ordinary meaning is a key goal sought
by the new dictionary-laden jurisprudence, two hard questions
arise. One is whether ordinary meaning is the right lodestar from
which to chart an interpretive path for statutory language. Setting
aside criminal laws for present purposes, it is far from self-evident
that the legislators who enact statutes and the entities or individu-
als who seek to abide by them rely primarily on their own linguistic
judgments as to what constitutes statutory meaning.365 Most laws
in our modern regulatory state are written to be interpreted and
understood not by laypersons but instead by legal experts: lawyers,
regulators, and individuals, governments, or businesses subject to
rules drafted by lawyers and regulators.366 This group of specialists
364. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 374.
365. As the Justices implicitly recognize, criminal statutes may be something of a special
case principally because the cohort of potential criminals is less likely to receive advance legal
counsel than individuals or businesses in the civil context, and because the severity of
criminal punishment leaves individuals more vulnerable if the law’s prohibitions are not
sufficiently clear and understandable. See supra Part IV.A. However the distinction should
not be overdrawn. For many white collar crimes, attorneys may effectively serve as
translators ex ante as well as defenders ex post.
366. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Why Linguistics? 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1047, 1051-54
(1995); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057,
1057-58 (1995); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
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develops the meaning of statutory prohibitions, directives, or
entitlements based on background legislative understandings,
current pragmatic considerations, and evolving societal circum-
stances. Emphasis on ordinary meaning as a core, presumptively
valid, legal construct seems seductively simplified, in that the legal
interpretive community’s attribution of meaning to a statute is both
“complex and normatively driven.”367 
The second question is whether, assuming arguendo that ordinary
meaning is an interpretive end worth striving for, dictionaries are
a useful means of getting there. As Hart and Sacks observed,
dictionary definitions are an extensive but not exhaustive historical
record of how words have been used in the past.368 Dictionaries do
not purport, in a current statutory setting, to select a particular
meaning as “ordinary,” much less to identify the meaning that is
most appropriate to this current setting. Even definitions that
identify the prototypical use for a word also list a series of other
common or acceptable uses. In order to decide whether a dictionary
definition signifies a usage that is common enough to be “ordinary,”
one must know more about the word’s contextual reference points.
Notably, this includes what members of Congress may have had in
mind when they drafted, negotiated, and enacted the provision
containing the word, and also who the intended audience is for the
statutory provision.369 Moreover, if, as Hart and Sacks contend, a
dictionary’s basic role should be no more than to confirm that the
meaning of a word as it is commonly or ordinarily employed with
reference to a certain statutory setting is also linguistically
permissible,370 then the Court’s up-front invocation of dictionary
definitions risks undermining this contextually oriented framework.
The Court’s dictionary jurisprudence has not sought to answer
either of these questions. Yet the Justices over the past twenty-five
years have come to embrace dictionaries as worthy of regular
consultation when they begin substantive analysis in their majority
opinions.371 Our findings make clear that this development encom-
L. REV. 369, 381, 383 (1989).
367. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 337, at 1094.
368. See supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 350-53 and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., supra Parts III.A. and IV.C. 
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passes liberals and conservatives, purposivists and textualists.372
We also noted that differences in levels of use between individual
Justices have declined over time, as the entire Court has become
comfortable invoking dictionary definitions.373 
The broad-based and unquestioning endorsement of dictionaries
distinguishes them from legislative history and the canons. Those
two high profile interpretive factors have been subject to searching
critiques or vigorous defenses from individual Justices374 as well as
from other judges and legal scholars.375 This set of critical perspec-
tives has apparently influenced the Court’s patterns of reliance.376
By contrast, the Justices seem to regard dictionaries as less
controversial than other resources, perhaps in part because they
perceive definitions as essentially “closer” to the text itself. The
perceived closeness may explain why dictionary discussion almost
always occurs at or near the start of the Court’s analysis—before
372. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.
373. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
374. On legislative history, compare, for example, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-30 (1997) (criticizing use of legislative
history), with STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 100 (2010)
(defending use of legislative history). See also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 7, at 161-62
(discussing extended and intense disagreement between Justice Scalia and Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Souter, and White regarding the value of legislative history as an interpretive
resource). On canons, compare, for example, SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra,
at 25-26 (praising the language canons for their relative clarity and common sense virtues)
and SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 51-339 (celebrating and defending the value of scores
of language and substantive canons), with Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
138 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discounting language canons as a fallback that should be
put aside when there are good reasons not to apply them), and EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 260-61 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing substantive canon being
applied as a “clear statement rule,” thereby relieving a court of its obligation “to give effect
to all available indicia of legislative will”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
375. On legislative history, see for example, Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 7, at 125-28;
Easterbrook, supra note 141, at 444-45; and Kozinski, supra note 141, at 811-14. On canons,
see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 277-82, 285-
86 (1985); John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283,
289-95 (2002); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn
Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562, 572 (1992); Rubin, supra note 11, at 580.
376. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 146, at 222-24 (reporting decline in use of
legislative history among newly arrived conservative Justices and also some long-serving
liberal Justices); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 28, at 44-51 (reporting rise in use of canons
among newer conservative Justices and also some continuing liberal Justices). 
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canons, legislative history, precedent, agency deference, or other
resources.
In addition, and relatedly, the Justices seem attracted to
dictionaries based on their objective and non-ideological framework.
Legislative history is created by Congress and there is concern that
it can be strategically inserted or adjusted by legislators.377 Canons
are created by the courts and there are similar concerns about
judicial manipulation.378 By contrast, dictionaries are promoted as
an independently constituted source of meaning, removed from the
possibly insidious influences of either the legislative or judicial
branch.
Further, notwithstanding occasional expressions of warning from
Justice Scalia,379 the Court in developing its dictionary culture has
essentially ignored the range of concerns persistently expressed over
two decades about the validity of dictionaries as a resource.380
Taking account of these criticisms might lead the Justices to reduce
or modify their reliance on dictionary definitions, and it almost
surely would result in a more careful and defensible approach to
dictionary use.
In the end, a combination of factors doubtless helps to explain the
Justices’ new and still-rising appetite for dictionaries as an aid to
determining statutory meaning. Whether consciously or not, the
Justices seem to have reached a consensus that dictionaries are
objective or authoritative guides to statutory meaning.381 As we have
demonstrated at length, however, the image of dictionaries as an
objective source of authority or a pathway to ordinary meaning is a
mirage. At the same time, despite its subjectivity in practice, the
Court’s burgeoning reliance on dictionary definitions has inevitably
shaped the perceptions and practices of the attorneys who present
legal arguments to the Justices. These lawyers predictably choose
377. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371,
376-77. 
378. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 375, at 277-82; Ross, supra note 375, at 562; Rubin,
supra note 11, at 586.
379. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
380. See supra Part II.A-B.
381. See supra paragraph in text following note 48; supra paragraph in text following note
122.
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dictionary definitions calculated to advance their positions in
response to the Court’s surging and standardless use of those
definitions.382
Moreover, when dictionaries are granted an exalted status, courts
find it easier to invoke them in ways that discount or ignore other
more contextual resources. The elevation of dictionary-based
ordinary meaning analysis raises serious concerns about the failure
to consider relevant statutory context, concerns repeatedly voiced by
scholars and appellate judges. Those concerns are exacerbated by
the Justices’ highly individualized approach to dictionary usage.
Given the Court’s institution-wide embrace of this resource, it is
predictable that dictionary-based analysis will at times preempt
review of other contextual factors. Yet the Court continues to grow
its appetite for dictionary definitions while making no attempt to
answer critics’ concerns or to provide an explanation for its own
selective practices.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown that, in the Rehnquist and Roberts
eras, dictionaries have become a principal resource for determining
the meaning of statutes. Dictionary usage has risen from 3.3 percent
of all decisions during the final five years of the Burger Court to
33.7 percent of our dataset decisions for the last three Roberts Court
Terms in our study.383 Throughout this period of dramatically higher
usage, the Court has failed to engage with interested legal audi-
ences who have expressed skepticism regarding the Justices’
subjective, standardless, and seemingly impulsive dictionary prac-
tices. The Justices also have not engaged with one another on the
increased role played by dictionaries. In the case of legislative
history, the Court’s decline in usage has featured a spirited
382. See generally supra Part III.B (reporting that fewer than half the words cited to a
dictionary in parties’ briefs had dictionary citations in the Court’s opinion). We plan to explore
in a future research project the degree of congruence between parties’ dictionary citations and
the citations in Roberts Court opinions, and to compare this degree of congruence with
evidence regarding parallel patterns between party briefs and Roberts Court opinions for the
canons and legislative history.
383. See supra note 28 for discussion of 3.3 percent figure; see also supra text following note
128 for discussion of 33.7 percent figure.
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debate—in judicial opinions and outside writings—between Justice
Scalia and various colleagues who defend recourse to such pre-
enactment materials.384 By contrast, the growth in dictionary usage
has not been accompanied by any dialogue between the Justices as
to whether the Court’s practices are furthering or undermining its
interpretive objectives.
We have attempted to document the scope of the subjectivity
problem, and to develop a functional analysis that highlights some
disturbing doctrinal consequences associated with dictionary use.
Against this background, we invoke our metaphor of the cocktail
party in a fourth and final form, now with due regard to the party’s
lingering effects.385 We believe dictionary usage may add value to
the Court’s analyses in certain limited circumstances.386 We also
appreciate the counterargument: dictionary definitions are
surplusage that should be replaced by evidence or illustrations of
common usage.387 However, because we do not expect the Justices
to stop using dictionaries, we recommend that the Court consider
adopting a three-step plan in order to foster a healthier approach to
its dictionary habit.
First, the Court should recognize the existence of a problem. After
a dramatic increase in dictionary usage, unaccompanied by the
development of standards despite persistent and persuasive
critiques, the Justices need to acknowledge that they are operating
with virtually unbridled discretion in the dictionary domain.
Assuming arguendo that the search for ordinary meaning can
contribute to the resolution of interpretive disputes, the dictionary
approach adopted by the Court does not enhance the prospects for
384. See sources cited on legislative history disagreements among the Justices supra note
374.
385. For the record, “cocktail party” has been used in four different senses in this Article:
as a setting for ordinary conversation, see supra note 2 and accompanying text; as a milieu
that encourages selective listening, see supra note 18 and accompanying text; as a location
where one looks for friends to vindicate personal preferences, see supra note 183 and
accompanying text; and now as the scene of risky, habit-forming behavior.
386. See generally supra Part IV.A (discussing notice function in criminal law cases); supra
notes 198-214 and accompanying text (discussing two way station cases in which Court
candidly recognized that dictionary definitions were inconclusive and other interpretive
factors were essential to reach a decision).
387. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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developing a reasonable or responsible sense of what meaning is
ordinary.
Second, in order to begin imposing limits on its current seemingly
unlimited discretion, the Court should adjust its patterns of usage
to make them more transparent and principled. We offer no specific
preferred approach ourselves, but we believe the Court should
embark on at least some of the following efforts: (a) reduce dictio-
nary cherry-picking by identifying one or more general dictionaries
as presumptive sources and explaining the basis for their selection;
(b) consult a presumptive minimum number of dictionaries for every
contested word or phrase, probably at least four rather than the
current one or two; (c) develop a rationale for when it is appropriate
to use a general dictionary, a legal dictionary, or both; (d) similarly,
develop a rationale for when to use enactment date, filing date,
both, or neither.
Finally, we recommend that the Court make every effort to avoid
invoking the dictionary as a barrier to larger contextual consider-
ations, including especially factors that reflect the thinking of
Congress and the Executive. Dictionary definitions are records of a
word’s past uses that are devoid of statutory context. Relying on
these definitions to limit or foreclose inquiry into background
factors—such as how Congress likely meant to use the word and
how agencies have regularly applied it—undermines informed
judicial review. It also disrespects the interpretive resources
contributed by the politically accountable branches.
